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§, INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Within the final synoptic terms of the Sellarsian scientific worldview not only is 
science considered a value-laden activity but so, too, are media instrumentally 
entangled as part of our practical reality. Consider how, via the Einsteinian 
perspective, mass exists not as it was conceived of in Newton’s theory—i.e., those 
masses no longer exist. Nonetheless, the references involved do succeed, wherein such 
masses do exist in their functional counterparts (insofar as they are predicated 
upon generic similarity. Without a blind causal theory of reference but, instead, 
wielding an epistemic view construed around similarity, both are generically 
similar as mass-concepts. Just as we can make sense of the claim that Newtonian 
physics is approximately true but, strictly speaking, false, we can also make sense 
of a scientific scaffolding through rational comparisons. Such is the 
harmonization of the irreducible normative nature of persons and the ultimately 
 EKIN ERKAN 561 
 
physical nature of the universe, which includes persons-in-the-world. As it 
concerns our project, the puzzle we deal with does not run against the Sellarsian 
harmonization of the scientific and manifest image but, instead, engages with 
Sellars’ scenography of conceptual change. Inverting the traditional logical 
empiricism of correspondence, Sellars defines observables ideally in terms of 
theoreticals. As we advance through our project, let us recall the Sellarsian 
apothegm that: 
“[s]cience may offer instruments, even prostheses, to improve and supplement our 
basic, biologically determined capacities; perhaps we shall even be able to augment 
those biologically determined capacities by genetic engineering, but at any point 
there will always be some basic, minimal observational capacities and a 
corresponding vocabulary, some minimal set of basic actions and a corresponding 
vocabulary, and those will, to a very large degree, determine the way it makes sense 
for us to parse the world into the objects we deal with and care about. For most of 
the objects we are concerned with, there will be no intelligible definitions in pure 
scientific language unladen with any reference to norms and practices.”1 
Just as Sellars is pellucid in demonstrating how correspondence rules ought 
not be treated as definitions of theoretical expressions in terms of their 
observation language expressions—underscoring the semantic autonomy of 
theoretical expressions that cannot be captured in observation language—so too 
will we examine semantics and applied mathematics-cum-physics 
correspondence rules as proposals for reconsidering our observational 
vocabulary. In doing so, we will closely engage with philosopher of science Mark 
Wilson’s work in Physics Avoidance, prodding the nine essays that comprise this 
books into a unique trajectory so as to carve an analytic and rationalist theory of 
media vis-à-vis set theory, while accepting an inherent contrast between norms of  
correctness and effective thinking routines.  
Mathematics' abilities to capture nature's unfolding processes within its own 
conceptual terms rests upon its capacities for supplying algorithms that can 
graphically engage in deduction numerically, bolstered by the hope of paralleling 
natural processes. Inter alia, Wilson’s project shows that nature presents us with a 
multiplicity of manifolds that simply cannot be smoothly mapped (vide the 
problems of graphing a bird’s flight over our curvaceous Earth, a problem which 
 
1 Willem DeVries, Wilfred Sellars, Chesam, Acumen Publishing, 2005, p. 279. 
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we shall often return to). Thus, even our most basic/fundamental modes of 
effective mathematical reasoning falls short of the ‘real extent’ of natural 
processes. Mathematicians have developed sophisticated strategies that string 
together patchworks of numerical approximation, despite the algorithmic 
limitations upon our concrete reasoning capacities. There is, in turn, a trans-
historical element to Wilson’s pursuit in Physics Avoidance, one which is driven by a 
self-correcting (Sellarsian) scientificity—directed at knowledge, while constantly 
refining itself both methodologically and substantively. Kindling the critiques of 
twentieth-century thinkers such as Clifford Truesdell and Walter Noll on the 
essential idealization thesis of physics (i.e., that ‘physics always idealizes’) while 
simultaneously parsing a distinction that was conceived of with the nineteenth-
century distinctions between rari-constant and multi-constant approaches to 
elasticity (associated with the derivational methods pursued by Navier and 
Cauchy, respectively), Wilson approaches limits and infinitesimals qua multi-
scalar localization. Meticulously engaging with Wilson’s rendering of the problem 
of the physical infinitesimal, we not only set out to complicate the historical 
discussion of matter—which has bedeviled the entire epoch of classical 
mechanics' reign—but also to hold a candle to a novel methodological means of 
approaching the philosophy of media. Henceforth, we shall seek to illuminate the 
developmental exigencies that have not only lacerated and left scars upon 
modern philosophy of science but also the conceptual consideration of scientific 
laws via counterfactual grounding. 
Wilson argues that the standard categorizations of ‘Theory T thinking’—
logic-centered conceptions of scientific organization (canonized via logical 
empiricists in the mid-twentieth century)—dampens the understanding and 
appreciation of those strategic subtleties working within science. By ‘Theory T 
thinking’, we mean to describe the simplistic methodology in which mathematical 
science allegedly supplies ‘processes’ that parallel nature's own in a tidily 
isomorphic fashion, wherein ‘Theory T’s’ feigned rigor and methodological 
dogmas advance inadequate discrimination that fails to distinguish between 
explanatory structures that are architecturally distinct. One of Wilson's main 
goals is to reverse such premature exclusions and, thus, early on Wilson returns 
to John Locke's original physical concerns regarding material science and the 
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congeries of descriptive concern insofar as capturing varied phenomena (i.e., 
cohesion, elasticity, fracture, and the transmission of coherent work) encountered 
amongst ordinary solids like wood and steel are concerned. Of course, Wilson 
methodologically updates such a purview by appealing to multiscalar techniques 
of modern computing, drawing from Robert Batterman's work on the greediness 
of scales and Jim Woodward's insights on causation. 
§I, "PRAGMATICS' PLACE AT THE TABLE"  
Here, Wilson ushers in an investigative context with which to explore the varied 
explanatory architectures of compression through which we capture the physical 
world in tractable terms (recapitulating the central argument of Wandering 
Significance). The kind of contextual dependencies that were underscored by 
twentieth century ‘common sense’ philosophers such as J.L. Austin are active 
within properly operating physical science. Recent progresses in multiscalar 
modeling of complex materials such as steel or granite demonstrate how scientific 
‘success’ can be achieved solely if the descriptive vocabularies utilized are 
subjected to a monitored set of contextual restrictions and usages, or linguistic 
labor.  
Wilson finds himself in agreement with Jerry Fodor's account of the language 
of thought, whereby thought concerning the world is prior to thought about how to change 
world. Here, appeals to ‘context’ can not resolve this distinction. According to 
Fodor, the argument unfolds as such: 
1) The tasks that require language for successful execution generally demand 
that articulated stretches of individual sentences get laid down in dialogue(s), 
which reveals the linguistic level at which pragmatic purpose displays itself (i.e., 
that ‘meaning is use’). 
2) However, individual ‘component sentences’ within such dialogues must be 
understood before the purpose of the larger groupings to which they belong to 
can be adequately recognized. 
3) Parsing such ‘component sentences’ rests upon a foundation of lexical grasp 
and grammatical recursion. 
4) Thus, such recursive processes of semantic recognition transpire before the 
pragmatic purpose of a dialogue can be grasped, whereby the ‘primary 
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meanings’ of such component sentences are already determined.2  
Wilson, however, seeks to liberate philosophy from Fodor's anti-pragmatic 
straitjacket, turning to modern engineering in order to evaluate modeling tasks 
whereby a collection of independent algorithms are controlled by and appeal to 
an external register that ‘monitors’ or ties together and overarches their localized 
purposes. With structured discourse as it pertains to vocabularies that utilize 
terms such as ‘force’ and ‘pressure’, physical significances are adjusted and 
undergo subtle reorientations in referential attachment, thus reducing 
computational complexity for the sake of systematization (this is a kind of 
‘avoidance’). These reorientations "can easily baffle the observer who has not 
appreciated the efficiencies offered by these contextualized adjustments in 
meaning", or the sensitivities to usage (Wilson 2018: 5). Threading effective 
language design with multiscalar modeling, Wilson illuminates the variegated 
aspects of classificatory reference that semantically reference necessitates vis-a-vis 
compartmentalized registration. The multiscalar methods that Wilson surveys 
demonstrate how "descriptive problems of an otherwise insurmountable 
complexity can be conquered by breaking the task at hand into a set of local 
investigations whose relationships to one another are carefully monitored by a set 
of markets that keep track of investigative intent" (4-5). We can therefore make a 
distinction between executing complicated sequential routines and appreciating 
their underlying strategic rationale, so as to create a parallel with how descriptive 
vocabularies adjust referential foci qua investigative context and developmental 
mechanisms.  
If cognitive architecture involves tacit adjustments in thinking, what does this 
mean for the representational structure of the syntactic demands in question? In 
order to answer this query we must examine the premise of compressive schemas. 
Let us consider, for instance, two standard pictorial modes, TIFF and JPEG 
formats, wherein the JPEG image employs far less data points than the TIFF 
image. With TIFF images, we see how data is encoded on a pixel-by-pixel basis 
(pixels encoded independently of one another). In the JPEG image, every pixel’s 
front-end registration governs a fixed span of back-end determinacy, as if the 
 
2 Jerry A. Fodor, LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 14. 
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individual pixels of the TIFF had dissolved, forming an assemblage based on 
large scale hierarchies. With compressive schemas, on the other hand, there is an 
enactive scaffold of exploiting contextual registers. This begin with a broad 
metric Q1, followed up by finer grained metrics Q2 that rely upon the response 
to Q1, and so on through a nested array of further queries Q3, Q4, etc. Such 
interdependencies unfold within a segregated front-end register (Q1, Q2, Q3) 
etc., followed by an enumeration of their respective answers (A1, A2, A3,..). Such 
representational tactics are termed multiple register schemes, where syntactic 
complexity is reduced through scope restrictions vis-a-vis policies of contextual 
localization. Wilson remarks that "[p]resent-day philosophy of language could 
become more supple if its practitioners more warmly appreciated the substantive 
reductions in syntactic complexity achievable through various policies of 
contextual localization" (9). A conception of computational pragmatics as such is 
privy to responding registrations of linguistic capacities with respect to data and 
reasoning qua compression.  
Such ‘straightforward’ reasoning procedures—a data sieve of sorts—transpire 
in modern engineering through the employment of particularized reasoning 
architectures in multiscalar design. This problem more thoroughly unfolds in 
Wilson's fifth essay, "The Greediness of Scales" but beforehand we must elaborate 
upon a critical term, the Representative Volume Element (RVE). The RVE 
denotes the descriptive depiction linked to a set of target-events in terms of the 
characteristic size-scale of an object during which those events unfold. The RVE 
level characteristics for steel demonstrate the central problem lurking behind the 
tyranny of scales problem: 
"[a]s we inspect ever smaller hunks of metal, we initially find that, starting at a 
macroscopic RVE length of one meter, steel obeys the same rules for stretching and 
compression through a large number of smaller scalar choices. However, when we 
eventually reach a characteristic length of about .1 millimeter, this regular scaling 
behavior fails, and the material responds to pushes and pulls in a different manner. 
Below this critical characteristic length, a complex hierarchy of varying behaviors 
comes into view as we inspect our metal at ever smaller RVE levels" (11). 
As every RVE level interacts with the others in variegated and intervening 
ways, the attempt to capture the behavior of any piece of steel through a bottom-
up molecular method generates descriptive overload. With a steel bar, for 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 566 
 
instance, there are induced dislocation movements that ‘pile up’ as we increase 
our RVE—the molecular bonds below become less protected, and our steel turns 
brittle. Such a change in response behavior after repeated loadings and unloading 
is called a hysteresis effect. The hysteresis effect presented a challenge for French 
theoretical physicist Pierre Duhem, who, toiling away at the indeterminacy of 
experimental criteria (c.f., the Duhem–Quine thesis) attempted to develop a 
thermomechanical framework that could model complex materials in a single-
level fashion. Thus unfolded the “tyranny of scales,” which describes the obstacle 
to computation wherein the range of size scales that we must tie together when 
assembling a composite story becomes impossible if we work in bottom-up 
fashion, beginning form the molecular scale and moving upwards. Multiscalar 
techniques extract new conditions, refined and localized estimates, from previous 
local estimates calculated within the RVE modeling that corresponds to a higher 
scale length. Thus, multiscalar modeling’s upshot is that it presents an internally 
linked equilibrium through homogenization; beginning with the macroscopic scale 
and moving downwards, the multiscalar scheme decomposes its modeling efforts 
into small processes that involve sub-models linked to specific RVE size scales. 
“These submodels concentrate entirely upon the locally dominant behaviors 
normally witnessed at the appropriate RVE level”, allocating the task of tracking 
smaller disturbances to other sub-models and thus dividing descriptive labor (12-
13).  
That which is ‘dominant’ varies from one RVE scale length to the other. If 
we take the case of hysteresis in a steel rail, those occasionally intruding minor 
effects on one level reflect alterations that comprise dominating events at the 
RVE scale level of the dislocations. Similarly, with anholonomous behavior, or 
systems that consist of implicitly dependent parameters, values that prolong 
locally in determinate fashion prove to be multi-valued when considered on a 
global basis (e.g., the Riemannian manifold has a metric fundamentally distinct 
from the metrics of a Euclidean space). As such, we must contend with the matter 
of analytic continuation and prolonged use-application as it relates to a 
meromorphic function where, grappling with a new patch of application, the 
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same physical characteristics are not retained from a referential base.3 With the 
multiscalar scheme, each sub-model performs its unique computational duties in 
a tractable manner involving descriptive parameters, assembling a hierarchy of 
separate sub-model computations. With this layered process, corrective 
interscalar adjustments are introduced that reassess initial estimates as lower 
RVE sub-models dictate. The corrective process of homogenization, neither purely 
bottom-up nor top-down in its descriptive policies, continues running through 
the successive stages (macroscopic estimation  microscopic correction) as 
needed until an overall descriptive accord is reached. That is, at the macroscopic 
level, multiscalar modeling employs isotropic modeling to predict the local 
shearing and stress environment of a small RVE block and, focusing on 
macroscopic environmental pressure, moves to the microscopic level. Here it 
employs a laminate modeling so as to verify that the RVE will continue to 
homogenize to the same upper-scale parameters in the assigned stress 
environment. This anisotropic process continues, sending the corrected 
parameters back to the upper-scale model until a self-consistent ‘modeling 
assignment’ is reached, or the scheme is stabilized (15). 
Compared to the repetition of ‘storage and retrieval’ successive 
approximations not only does this provide a particularly rich gradient insofar as 
localized investigative context is concerned but, also, vis-à-vis differential 
equations, the RVE sub-models in question demonstrate how the same interior 
region can be described in syntactically inconsistent ways. On a macroscopic 
RVE scale, a region of a rock can be described as uniformly granite whereas a 
laminate model may contradict this description. As Wilson remarks, “multiscalar 
tactics practice a division of linguistic labor in which no participating party proves 
 
3 In his earlier work, Wilson examines questions such as: “[f]rom what source does that rigid ‘patch p 
determining patch q’’ character of an analytic function spring? Answer: from the way that such quantities 
grow to cover their full domains through a step-by-step process of analytic continuation”; “[h]ow do we reach 
complex numbers that lie beyond the dominion of our first exploratory series? […] This step-by-step process 
for pushing functional meaning from one local domain into another through appeal to overlapping series is 
called analytic continuation.” Working through complexity and prolongation, Wilson demonstrates how 
“[m]any analytic ‘functions’ manifest a twisted personality that refuses to spread out uniformly across the 
complex plane.” See: Mark Wilson, Wandering Significance, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 
312-319. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 568 
 
‘more correct’ than any other” (16).4 Multiscalar schemes’ instructive advantages 
are correlated to the fact that their component investigate stages are linked to 
physical scale size in a direct and palpable way, allowing for one to ascertain 
linked contextual shifts. 
Semantically speaking, with multiscalar modeling descriptive content is 
encoded within the architecture of the enveloping computational scheme—as 
data is shuttled from a local registration to another—rather than this descriptive 
content being captured within any particular component sub-model/one 
pertinent scale-size. RVE divisions as such correspond to descriptive 
opportunities, by which we mean “physical circumstances whose dominant 
ranges of variation can be adequately captured in a smallish number of 
descriptive parameters” that are feasibly calculable and, consequently, “offered 
within nature itself ” (17). To be more specific, this means that a multiscalar 
reasoning scheme is successful solely if the component parts, or the specific RVE 
levels cited within the model, capture the special descriptive opportunities that 
are endowed by the hierarchal layers of ‘dominant behavior’, thus mimicking the 
complexities of a target material that can be identified empirically (e.g., through 
a microscope). When parsing such questions about nature, we need to anchor our 
‘syntax’ to physical locales which supply the best opportunities to compute 
‘outwards’ to extrapolate the rest of the nearby terrain. An integrated architecture 
can thus be mereological, where the integrated parts prove greater than the sum 
of its descriptive parts. Multiscalar modeling illuminates descriptive information 
about a target system whose contents do not otherwise appear in the “localized 
statements generated within its sundry sub-models” (19). 
Thus, complexity is reduced by concentrating upon dominant effects within 
every sub-model, as each RVE sub-model is assigned the duty of capturing solely 
the central physical processes witnessed at a characteristic scale length, leaving 
minor effects to other RVE choices. Correction missives are integrated from 
companion sub-models that circumscribe other choices of RVE scale. This is a 
“concentrate-upon-dominant-behaviors stratagem” (19) where the full scheme 
 
4 It remains the ambition of a future philosophical endeavor to mend the partition of descriptive tractability, 
or in this case the descriptive practice concerning an integrated networks of localized tasks qua 
contradiction, as a paraconsistent (metaphysical) logic compatible with Dialetheism. 
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defers minor effects’ tracking to the sub-model level where these alterations 
initially appear as significant effects.  
Consider, for instance, the collision of billiard balls. With the standard 
treatments of Wren, Huygens and Newton, the billiard balls’ shapes do not vary 
throughout collision-interaction—instead, such treatments focus on codifying 
energy loss vis-à-vis coefficients of restitution. With the advent of high-speed 
photography and small-scale computing, contemporary continuum mechanics 
allows us to understand that the billiard balls actually compress and expand when 
they collide, with these changes occurring very fleetingly. Thus, high-speed 
photography prompts a ‘cut out’ by considering the billiard balls in specific terms 
vide Representative Time Elements (RTE)—as such, we are able to concern 
ourselves with the internal details particular to temporal intervals during which 
such compressions transpire, omitting other ‘faster time’ RTE emergences (20-
21). Thus, RTE terms offer us a particular scalar tyranny. This shows how, in 
principle, we simply can not describe material in single level molecular terms, 
which solely exist as ideals—or, to co-opt the academic philosophical parlance 
that Wilson cautions against, ‘in principle’—and not actualities.  
How do different scales ‘communicate’ with one another? That is, how do 
events that manifest on one characteristic scale process the lower RVE-level 
events? This process, of homogenization, consists of both coherent change and signal 
noise, with corrective messaging depending on how elastically dominant 
parameter patterns have been informed at higher RVE scales by lower ‘grain-
level’ submodels.5 The question then arises of how to syntactically model such 
corrective messages and homogenization methods. One such filter is the central 
limit method of extracting Gaussian modeling parameters of mean and variance, but, 
veering towards macroscale modeling, such stochastic processing does not treat 
material as properly laminate. Instead, it produces raw data generated within an 
individual scale of RVE sub-modeling. The multiscalar method, on the other 
 
5 “If our laminate sub-model flexes in a manner that is consistent with our upper scale E and G expectations, 
fine; no correction in our upper-scale reasoning is required. But if our sub-model recrystallizes within its 
new stress requirement, our upper-scale calculations must take this revised datum into consideration. So 
the corrective messages we send across scales should constitute reports on whether normal dominant 
behavior patterns have broken down or not” (22). 
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hand, allows for various scales to be held within a latticework of asymptotic limits, 
or in a collective ‘union’, whereby attributions are dependent upon one another.  
The linguistic register of context-sensitive dependency and concerns 
relegated to devices of language management are also central when articulating 
structural subdivisions. Terms that articulate the investigative architectures of 
structural subdivisions are what Wilson terms “devices of language management”. 
Such terms are not concerned with imperatives such as what is ‘true’ or ‘false’—
indeed, we do not assume that data established or stresses computed within a 
laminate sub-level can be “entered freely into an upper-scale treatment without 
undergoing significant homogenization filtering” (25). Instead, we are concerned 
with the practical endeavor of how truth-values are obtained vis-à-vis enveloping 
schemes of placement, and, thus, are interested in that which is appropriate, or 
inappropriate, to the reasoning tasks at hand. Understanding ‘use’ as equipollent 
to reasoning as practical purposiveness means that it can precede semantics, 
which are adequate attachments to exterior circumstances. Here, Wilson dissents with 
asservations that retain investigative heuristics with the virtues of efficient 
reasoning, noting that conventional divisions between semantics and pragmatics 
neglect the investigative strategy’s molding. While scale-based isolation permits 
reduction(s) in descriptive vocabulary—e.g., a term such as ‘force’ can adjust its 
precise referential focus to suit the RVE unit within which it is presented—
semantic adaptation causes substantial data compression and, consequently, 
inferential difficulties when terms migrate from an (inconstant and divergent) 
descriptive semblance.  
Descriptive terms do not acquire referential connections to the physical world 
until their employment is situated within a localized investigative context—
consider, for instance, the managerial positioning of terms like “true”/”truth”6. 
 
6 With Tarski’s semantic concept of truth, we that the correspondence theory definition of truth is in 
conformity with the classical Aristotelian conception of truth, wherein there are enactive underlying 
pragmata that structure the truth-value of statements and “[t]o say of what is that it is not, or of what is not 
that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true”. See: Aristotle, 
Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, Sioux Falls, NuVision Publications, 2009 §1011b25. According to Tarski, both 
laws of contradiction and of excluded middle can be deduced from this formula. In Tarski’s definition of 
truth of an interpreted sentence, a sentence A is true if and only if A is satisfied by every infinite sequence 
of objects. Such a formulation expresses a concept of absolute truth wherein the truth of a sentence is not 
restricted to a certain domain or circumstances. For Tarski, truth is not relative to circumstances. See: 
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With materials such as steel or rubber there are significant ‘frozen disorders’ at 
middle-level RVE scales (for instance, dislocations and grain boundaries). Such 
irregularities preclude these materials from satisfying the equilibrium 
requirements necessitated within elementary expositions. Were we to adhere to 
the terms of traditional correlational demand, we would remonstrate the 
assignment of temperature to these materials. Here, we must direct our attention 
to applicational migrations: of course, we do not have reason to question that terms 
such as ‘temperature’ capture critical characteristics of a macroscopic steel bar. 
Nonetheless, we do not possess a clear (iconic) picture of its referential content. 
Thus, our semantic lesson, as it involves inferential terms like ‘force’ and 
‘temperature’, is directed towards common ‘meanings’ that allow unique utility in 
novel RVE environments qua behavioral-contextual circumscription(s).  
Wilson’s adaptive approach emphasizes how mastery of ‘wandering words’ 
like ‘force’ or ‘use’ precede firm referential semantics; only after applicational 
enclosures are set can they attach to moorings suited for novel modeling 
environments. Thus, Wilson does not agree with Fodor’s anti-pragmatic 
approach to meaning, an a priori assurance which suppresses adaptive behaviors 
by compounding variegated facets of language-learning. Fodor and fellow anti-
pragmatists such as Susan Stebbing7 argue that semantic scenarios (inherently) 
anticipate altered adjustments, claiming that terms such as ‘force’ are “first 
assigned, strong, referentially determinate core meanings before the pragmatic 
influences of applicational context can begin their work” (30).  
Terms such as ‘force’, ‘temperature’, or ‘cause’ are granted enlarged descriptive 
 
Alfred Tarski "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 
Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983, pp. 152-278. With Gupta's Rule of Reason, the mode of truth-values 
construction is wholly determined by Tarski's semantic concept of truth, so that this mode of construction 
is nonarbitrary, despite the bootstrapping of predicates. However, bootstrapping may, in fact, involve 
arbitrary extension; Gupta observes that the two conditionals within the ‘if and only if’ of Tarski's formula 
represent ordinary material conditions but that they serve to lift and lower assertions from one contextual 
level to another—that is, bootstrapping our way through non-successor stages by instrumentalizing the 
outcome of previous stages to the extent that they gave as a stable verdict (i.e., Gupta's Rule of Reason). 
See: Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MIT, 2003. Wilson’s work on 
language management focuses on the inferential transitions transferred by the word ‘true’ with respect to 
multiscalar architecture. 
7 Lizzie Susan Stebbing, Pragmatism and French Voluntarism, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 
2013. 
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utilities when they are developed within local adaptations, whereby such 
arrangements are protected by ‘homogenization barriers’. Within the multiscale 
model, structural portioning into segregated patching abets swift processes of 
adaption; it is precisely the ‘ready reprogrammability’ of any multiple-register 
language’s format that facilitates the adaptive plasticity of its conceptual practice. 
In short, the descriptive focus of terms such as ‘force’, ‘temperature’, ‘strain 
energy’, etc. is contingent upon scale-level application; “arrangements facilitate 
the reassignment of old computational routines to novel applicational purposes” 
(30).8 
Wilson’s conception of the specialized space of  possibility introduces the context 
of the ‘controlled search’, where laminate possibilities predetermine both spaces 
of assembly and companion searches. Any initial search is initially given its 
determinant ‘shape’ by equilibrium-state and finite-element computation(s) that 
use trial-stress distribution to search through a collection, or ‘space’, of 
possibilities before cross-checking these in light of their laminate underpinnings. 
After searching through a new ‘space’ of laminate possibilities, companion 
searches settle upon suitable fixed points. In the case of a granite/gneiss rock 
sample, multi-scalar analysis obtains lower-scale recrystallization possibilities that 
are kept in tandem with initial search space (preliminary assignment of stress to 
the entirety of a rock based upon a suitable macroscopic model with highly 
stressed sectors that allow for recrystallizations). What does this mean for 
practical possibilities within possible worlds? Much like Tarskian semantics, Saul 
Kripke’s interpretation of modal language motivates the concept of a possible 
world, or ‘cut-out’, to give substance to the notion of alternative extensions and 
alternative domains of quantification. Multi-scalar considerations—particularly 
localized search spaces—qualify such capacious considerations. 
Let us introduce a term from differential mathematics, the “boundary 
 
8 There is a curious parallel between Wilson’s cyclic description of our restricted linguistic capacities, 
“condemned to wobble between seasons of brash inferential extension and epochs of qualified retrenchment 
later on” (32) and André Leroi-Gourhan's notion of the evolutional chaîne opératoire; according to Gourhan, 
"[f]or each species a cycle is established between its technical ability (its body) and its ability to organize 
itself (its brain). Within this cycle, through economy of design, a way opens up toward increasingly pertinent 
selective adaptation". See: André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, Cambridge: MA, MIT Press: 1993, p. 
60. 
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condition”, which “describes data that have been compressed to fit onto a lower 
dimensional surface extending in a time-like direction into the future” (35). In the 
example of a collapsing bubble, the boundary conditions denote how surface 
tensions tax energy from the interior. The boundary condition illuminates the 
bricolage between interfacial conditions and interior modes of description, 
pulling the two within homogenized arrangement (much like the sub-models that 
are homogenized within multiscalar modeling).  
Just as ‘force’ undergoes referential refocusing vis-à-vis scale change, 
considerations of ‘dominant behavior’ that rest upon interior/exterior data 
allocations are reassigned when RVE levels are adjusted. Therefore, the 
characteristic regional localities that correspond to descriptive vocabularies are 
linked to RVE scale (re)adjustments:  
 “[w]hat was formerly described as a smooth and placid surface around a granite 
block is now approached as a jagged landscape in which significant layers of 
complicated surface chemistry are active [….] on a macroscopic level the 
indentability of a steel plate appears to be a localized property of its outer surface 
alone, but a lower-scale examination reveals that such traits depend vitally upon 
capacities for plastic flow that transpire many molecular layers away from the 
metal’s nominal surface” (37).  
§II, "PHYSICS AVOIDANCE"  
Let us apprehend the time lag that a fluid undergoes before regaining its former 
volume by considering the die well within a tube of toothpaste that is pushed 
upon: there is a short period of time before the toothpaste ‘remembers’ the 
uncompressed volume that it occupied inside the toothpaste tube. Such tacit 
considerations provoke an alternative form of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ investigation, 
which allots credence to (wave) disturbances that move through the interiors of 
continuous media. The notion of ‘cause’ generally focuses attention on 
evolutionary events of this stripe, and we can further consider such fluid-
compression paradoxes that apply to solid objects which appear to be 
superficially rigid, as in the example of two billiard balls colliding. If, for example, 
during T1, force is applied to the left of billiard ball A—with A adjacent to billiard 
ball B, which is to A’s right—during T2 billiard ball A stores strain energy through 
compression. Then, during T3, billiard ball A employs energy storage to re-expand, 
performing compressive work upon billiard ball B. Volume change is required for 
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this—each successive billiard ball must momentarily contract and, thereafter, re-
expand so as to transmit a compression wave across its interior. In order to 
rationalize these causal activities within fluids and billiard balls, we need to revise 
the notion of internal pressure with directional subtleties (e.g., intermediate 
conceptions between fluidity and sustaining shear such as ‘absolute pressure’).9 
Wilson discerns fundamental classes of explanatory architecture via applied 
mathematics' diagnostic tools. Running water is an event that rarely ever is 
encountered in a truly ‘steady’ state. By focusing upon steady-state conditions 
through evolutionary flow portraitures we can break down any temporally 
connected set of states and regard them as stochastic differential equations. By 
parsing computational pathways and time-effaced continua, we can bifurcate a 
system’s behavior into approximate divisions: 1) transitory response (this records how 
a moving wall of water first invades a pipe after a spigot is opened); 2) steady-state 
response (which becomes dominant as initial effects of transient response fade). Given 
our fluid flow example, we can examine what shifts transpire with an 
evolutionary-manifold to base-manifold adjustment. Chiefly, the ‘time’ variable 
is purged from the original modeling equation(s) as a shift to steady-state 
methodology is undergone. That is, base-manifolds offer a representative picture 
that factors out time. By considering structural alterations in a control parameter, 
terms such as ‘force’ and ‘cause’ acclimate to the explanatory landscape into 
which they are cast. Within the evolutionary framework, such terms attach 
themselves to processes that affect temporal change within a developing flow. 
Such is the case regardless of if we shift the background explanatory landscape 
from an initial conditions problem to a control variable setting (53). 
When we consider ‘causal processes’, we generally designate continuously 
acting evolutionary development (e.g., a sound wave moving through an iron bar) 
although this undoubtedly glosses over a gradient of evolutionary richness. This 
can perhaps be best captured with partial differential equations (PDEs), an 
endeavor that—although solidified circa 1750—was taken up earlier by Newton 
and Leibniz as they developed ordinary differential equations (ODEs) during the 
1670s. Newton and Leibniz’ development significantly advanced beyond finite 
 
9 Clifford Truesdell, “The Creation and Unfolding of the concept of Stress” in Essays in the History of 
Mechanics, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1968. 
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difference terms where time is divided into small step sizes (∆ti) and approximated 
temporal intervals (∆ti+1). As in Euler’s method of finite differences, which 
conflates ‘causes’ with ‘effects’ in describing infinitesimal relationships through 
approximate terms, we hereby exact a procrustean ‘data compression’. Ordinary 
differential equations, ODEs, serve as a ‘halfway point’ to a suitable 
mathematical representation of causal process; ODEs contain only one single 
independent variable which, within the evolutionary setting, is time (t). To 
capture the richness of causal processes robustly, we also need to account for 
spatial variations (x, y, z) as independent variables as well. PDEs take us 
significantly further as they account, at minimum, for one spatial variable (x) as 
well as time (t). 
There are a number of misunderstanding that have plagued the philosophical 
treatment of ‘cause’ since Bertrand Russell’s formative 1912 paper, “On the 
Notion of ‘Cause’”. Here, Russell, significantly inspired by Ernst Mach’s work on 
coherence and related complexity, makes the case that:  
 “[w]e cannot say that every law which has held hitherto must hold in the future, 
because past facts which obey one law will also obey others, hitherto 
indistinguishable but diverging in future. Hence there must, at every moment, be 
laws hitherto unbroken which are now broken for the first time. What science does, 
in fact, is to select the simplest formula that will fit the facts.”10 
Russel’s conclusion is premised upon the argument that the notion of ‘cause’ 
and ‘effect’ plays no significant role in science because ‘effects’ employ differential 
equations devoid of a pertinent ‘before and after’. However, according to Wilson, 
Russell’s critique glosses over the fact that finite differences (∆ti and ∆ti+1) provide 
a naturalized syntax for communicating causal processes when one “doesn’t have 
the vocabulary of the calculus available” (62). That is, Russell conflates distinct 
types of equational sets indiscriminately—Wilson illuminates that such 
considerations impinge upon the treatment of time (t).11 For instance, the steady-
 
10 Bertrand Russell, “On the Notion of Cause’”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series Vol. 13 (1912 - 
1913), p. 23. 
11 Wilson’s internal mathematical closure is certainly indebted to Descartes’ relationism, wherein any 
‘position’ within physics refers solely to the internal relationships of parts and not to any background container 
space or space-time such as in Newton’s absolutist conception. “Normally, this solitary factor is settled by 
an outside agency turning the crank, in which case time enters our picture as a control space intrusion” (96). 
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state strategy for modeling fluid flow gains significant computational advantages 
by suppressing the temporal transients which trouble how fluid flow behaves in ‘real 
life’ circumstances. Indeed, such altered differential equations provide a 
replacement modeling, but not as an attempt to capture genuine causal processes. 
The intentional suppression of direct registration in temporal processes allots for 
distinct richness which we lose in the syntactic indicators present within ongoing 
evolutionary developments.12 Alan Turing well understood the advantages to this 
‘suppression’ when he took up the “discrete-state machine” model as the relevant 
description for the brain’s functional operation(s), opposing it to “continuous-state 
machines”.13 Today, the set of core predictive analytic techniques involved with 
machine learning, such as logistic regression, Naive Bayes, k-nearest neighbors, 
decision trees or more recent variations can also be stratified from linear analysis 
to a ‘steady-state’ vector space of ‘suppression’ that allows binary classification 
(i.e., from lines of best fit). 
By disregarding temporal transients, the altered differential equations in steady-
state analysis come into prominence, marked by altered signatures. Notably, 
equations for ‘steady flow’ are, generally, of elliptic signature, which disregard time-
terms and produce equilibrium states in comparison to fully evolutionary sets 
which are hyperbolic.14 Differences in the signatures of differential equations’ 
operators indicate that relevant equations play unique explanatory roles within 
science. Formally speaking, what we have just described is Euler’s approximation 
 
12 Nancy Cartwright and those following her, such as Mathias Frisch, have argued that causal notions should 
be invoked as a doctrinal supplement to the canonical laws of physics that Russell bases his rejection upon. 
According to Frisch, causality-as-a-supplementary-condition provides a means of discarding unphysical 
solutions (i.e., “causal asymmetry”), such as ripples traveling inwards towards a focus (i.e., “circularly 
converging waves”) rather than outwards, as in a pond. For Wilson, to invoke such a ‘supplementation’ is 
mistaken, as “the basic relationships of causal evolutionary development are already marked within the 
mathematics of hyperbolic equations” and “[o]ptical circumstances are rarely suited to true evolutionary 
initial/boundary value modelings” (93; emphasis added). See: Mathias Frisch, Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and 
Non-locality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 289-342. 
13 Alan M. Turing, "Computing machinery and intelligence", Mind vol. 59, 1950, pp. 433-460. 
14 Elliptic signatures directly delineate a constant field of velocity vectors, which do not mark passing time in 
the direct manner of an evolutionary modeling (‘time’ does not appear as an independent variable in these 
equations). The distinctions between elliptic and hyperbolic signatures can be drawn back to Paul du Bois-
Reymond, although it is Jacques Hadamard’s distinctions in which we are presented with the relevant 
explanatory condensation. See: Jacques Hadamard, Lectures on Cauchy's Problem in Linear Partial Differential 
Equations, London, Forgotten Books, 2018. 
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method, a kind of the physics modeling where we begin with a purely 
evolutionary paradigm and reach an equilibrium-focused shift by treating an 
initial/boundary value problem as a pure boundary value problem, thus altering the 
explanatory landscape.15 Focusing on an interior membrane, such 
approximations exact an ‘avoidance’ (from which Wilson’s project gains its 
moniker)—that is, we examine the standard and differential equation for an 
interior membrane while conceding to the fact that we are not pursuing the 
physical processes responsible for boundary region behaviors.16 
Iterative computational techniques, or ‘shooting methods’,17 are used to resolve 
pure boundary value problems. With a single spatial variable (i.e., employing 
Euler’s reduced equation) we are obliged to reduce a three-dimensional topology 
to a computational path that responds to the top boundary (72). Given their PDE 
requirements, equations of elliptic signature—such as the ‘time-terms-dropped-
for-equilibrium’ or ‘drumhead equation’—solely accept analytic functions as 
solutions (viz., solutions that have been coordinated and are reproducible—that 
is, solutions that are universalizable).  
Such adjustments—transmogrifying temporal tracking events for their 
eventual inevitable equilibriums—creates a novel manipulation time that does not 
represent ‘natural endogenous time’. As it concerns the case study of the 
manipulation time capturing the driving rate when we increase the weight on a 
boundary (as it applies to our strut buckling problem), a manipulation time scale, 
Δt*, unfolds significantly slower than the internal relaxation time, Δt, required for 
the strut to damp out and settle into equilibrium naturally. In introducing a 
distinct time scale, such infinitesimal compressions occasion unique semantic 
conceptual difficulties. Vacillations in word reference are not whimsical but can 
 
15 The two forms of explanatory landscape differ insofar as an initial-boundary value problem (e.g., wave 
movement of a pulse inside of a metal strut) will consider the ‘interior fill in’ (or membrane) alongside initial 
conditions, the pressive arrow of time (t) and the boundary conditions. The explanatory landscape of a pure 
boundary value problem (e.g., equilibrium shape of a two-dimensional drumhead under varying edge 
tensions) consists of the interior membrane and boundary data. 
16 This boundary region, a cooperative harness through which we can obtain a viable physics for a continuous 
body, has a traction that we can contract into interior stress capable of interacting with the body forces and 
an element’s inertial response. 
17 These are called ‘shooting methods’ because they operate much like the angle-adjustments of a bow in 
archery, which are readjusted iteratively, increasingly attempting to localize on the target. 
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be fastened to the ways in which ‘cause’ serves as an instrument of language 
management. Consider the novel usage of ‘cause’ that Wilson provides us, in 
context with the modeling circumstances we have just surveyed:  
“‘Let’s figure out the effects than an increased weight will cause within the strut.’ 
Or, when we wish to alter out explanatory focus: ‘No, I’m more interested in how 
effects from the upper weight reach the middle of the beam.’” (77). 
As a specific explanatory topology is selected, ‘cause’ is prompted into an 
arena of supplementation. Altering the underlying explanatory landscape prods 
‘cause’ into conceptual conflation with words such as ‘pressure’. Through 
(holonomic) algebraic constraints—e.g., when we maintain that a bead stay on a 
wire, that a balls slides or rolls along a table top, or that a machine part remains 
rigid—we also glean tacit scales. On a small scale of resolution ΔL, for instance, 
the bead will not follow the curve of the wire but waver about its locus; through 
the coarser (observational) macroscopic ΔL*, however, we behold the moving 
bead as it is perfectly situated on the wire. 
Our empirical observations are under-constrained. Consider the use of a 
telescope to assemble an abundance of empirical observations, E, which fit within 
the form <xi, yi, ti>. To amalgamate these into a linear equation (y = mx + b; m 
and b operating here as undetermined variables) provides for a problem 
concerning alignment. Our combined empirical data, E, is over-constrained and 
contains errors (εi). According to Gauss and Lacroix’s resolution, we incorporate 
unknown error terms εi into each of our data points, such that we combine these 
observations, proffering <xi, yi + εi, ti>. Including εi alleviates over-constraint by 
offering extra variables, resulting in an under-constrained equational system.18 
Following Lagrange’s virtual “principle of least work”, Wilson introduces force-
like supplements (λi) which, in combination with the other operative forces, 
accord with the underlying F = ma principles, akin to the manner in which the 
 
18 According to equation-based object-oriented modeling languages, (e.g., Modelica, gPROMS and 
VHDLAMS), the existence of a single solution requires that the number of equations and variables 
(unknowns) are equal. If the number of equations is greater than unknowns, the model is said to be over-
constrained. Conversely, if the number of unknowns is greater than equations, the model is said to be under-
constrained. See: David Broman, Kaj Nyström, Peter Fritzson, "Determining Over- and Under-Constrained 
Systems of Equations using Structural Constraint Delta", Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on 
Generative Programming and Component Engineering, 2006, pp. 151-160. 
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error terms εi, resolve our combination-of-observations difficulties (85). Reducing 
descriptive complexity in this manner, we engineer (non-visible) internal activity 
to cancel aspects of exterior manipulation that oppose constraints. In practical 
applications, Lagrangian exploits of macroscopic data simplify a complicated 
microscopic situation vis-à-vis the manipulation of counterfactuals—consider, for 
instance, applying an external force or torque to a target structure that limit or 
tighten lower-scale arrangements. Inferential mechanical analytics in Lagrange’s 
manner are vital to the progress of science as a scaffold unmoored by empirical 
deviations and speculation; this is precisely how we erect a ‘reliable’ explanatory 
architecture that is not simply stilted by a priori (pre)determinations. 
§III, "FROM THE BENDING OF BEAMS TO THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL"  
Let us return to Leibniz's metaphysical views, which stem from mathematical 
concerns linked to the methodological considerations of classificatory-linguistic 
reference. Given his pioneering work on differential equations in 1684, Leibniz is 
one of the first scientists to attempt the physical modeling of equations at the 
infinitesimal scale (i.e., differential equations), working through many of the 
methodological toils that Wilson takes up in Physics Avoidance. In particular, 
Leibniz work on the elastic response of loaded beams illuminates both his 
metaphysics and, more acutely, his conception of free will. 
As most readers are likely aware, the most grating and ‘unscientific’ facet of 
Leibniz’ system is the assertion that the material universe is constituted of a nested 
array of compressed ‘monads’ that are not tethered to a spatio-temporal actuality 
but, nonetheless, determine what we see and do, possessing desires, perceptions, 
and actions. While, according to Leibniz’ monadology, the entire material world 
is controlled by monads that congregate in ordered hierarchy, this systematization 
is, nevertheless, rooted in sound modeling practice qua continuous materials. 
Hence, we can recover Leibniz’s thought by bridging his metaphysical 
outpourings with concrete mechanical engineering techniques, turning to the 
structural requirements of continuously flexible matter.  
Wilson notes that, “save for the material moduli that render wood more pliant 
and anisotropic than steel [….] both materials display the teleological capacity to 
‘remember a natural state’ characteristic of all solids” (101). One of our central 
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concerns here involves how Leibniz’ monads bolster a physics where continua are 
required to maintain internal coherence under dilation and compression. It is, in 
particular, the modeling equation suitable for a loaded beam that we shall turn 
to, recalling how—ignoring friction—beams behave like elastic solids (that is, 
they possess “natural equilibrium states to which they will always strive to 
return”; 102), Considering the steel beam that is loaded with rocks—between its 
‘loaded-with-rocks’ condition and its erstwhile ‘straight state’—we see that there 
is something akin to the ‘memory’ or ‘remembrance’ that Leibniz uncovers in his 
work on loaded equilibrium states. A material’s capacity to ‘remember’ an 
original state of molding diminishes with time, regaining a compromised and 
slightly curved end-state in between these two moments. Truly elastic solids 
display ‘perfect memory’ insofar as rest configurations are concerned, returning 
to this end-state rather quickly after being released from any binding constraints. 
In contrast, many materials display something akin to a ‘fading memory’ where, 
if a constrained position is maintained for a long period, such materials adept to 
the shape that is impressed upon them so as to minimize ‘strain energy’.  
Today, an amalgam of ‘smart materials’ have been engineered that regain 
various forms of earlier conditions depending upon earlier states; one such 
example are the temperature-respondent nickel-titanium alloy ‘smart antennas’ 
used for suborbital space vehicles such as sounding rockets. These antennas 
demonstrate what Leibniz presaged—that material displays a slight measure of 
being able to detect its neighboring media’s internal conditions and respond 
accordingly. Leibniz conceived of two types of force, dead and living force, related 
to our understanding of force and kinetic energy, respectively. The Leibnizian 
concept of memory behavior and the teleological sense in which a material is 
determined by a system's displacement from its final ends is partially indebted to 
Edme Mariotte, a French physicist lauded for his 1673 experiments on elastic and 
inelastic experiments with whom Leibniz was in communication.  
Let us further parse Leibniz’ appeals to the desires, perception, and action of 
inanimate materials with special regard to such invocations of ‘(material) 
personality’. Via his work on the dynamic behavior of colliding billiard balls, 
Leibniz set to develop a calculus by which elastic force could be measured, 
recognizing that the principle of elasticity is "the true cause of all phenomena of 
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the collision of bodies".19 Today, when we describe two billiard balls’ collision, we 
note that the “their incoming kinetic energy is temporally converted into internal 
potential energy depending upon the degree to which their contours have been 
distorted” and that “[a]fter these compressions reach a critical level, each ball 
will push back against the other by transferring its unwanted strain energy into 
new forms of moving energy, including spinning” (103-104). When describing 
such interactive events in terms laden with ‘personality’—as in his use of 
“potency” and the Aristotelean concept “entelechy”—Leibniz correctly 
emphasized notions such as strain energy, and, more generally, potential energy, 
as being teleological, for these materials necessarily appeal to natural rest-states.20 
The prevailing models of impact in Leibniz’ time were those of Huygens, Wren, 
and Newton, all of which assumed that billiard balls rebound without alteration of  
shape—that is, these models posited a matched asymptotics methodology that 
artificially collapses the scope of Δt* (where impactive events occur) to zero 
duration 0. 
Contra the computational compressions of such ‘zero-duration-of-impact 
approaches’, we would be shrewd to recall Leibniz' apothegm, natura non facit 
saltus, ‘nature does not make jumps’ (verbatim, “[i]n nature everything happens 
by degrees, and nothing by jumps”).21 For Leibniz, the “law of continuity” 
illuminates that there “is no assignable change in an instant” and that “this 
avoidance of leaps in the changes of bodies is due to an elastic force” that operates 
“in collision […] by gradual movements bodies that compress one another and 
then restore themselves yield to one another little by little and conserve their 
direction and force” (105). 
Today, we can utilize quantum-mechanical modeling to examine materials at 
the nanoscale and parse constrained equilibrium as it relates to energetic 
exchange and loss, but Leibniz was relegated to tracking such complex 
interactions within idealized circumstances. Thus, Leibniz turned to entirely 
 
19 Leibniz, Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, ed. Maria Rosa Antognazza, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, 
p. 301. 
20 Leibniz, “Of Body and Force: Against the Cartesians” in Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew 
and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1989, pp. 252-254. 
21 Leibniz, “Chapter xvi: The degrees of assent” in The New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. Peter 
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 473. 
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static situations, such as the shape that a beam would assume under a load of 
rocks. In his own mechanical modeling work, Leibniz focused on teleological 
reflection in relation to the Hookean capacity of a spring to exert a restoring force 
in direct proportion to the degree that it has been stretched or compressed away 
from its configuration, constructing a plausible beam model upon this basis.22 
Physics before Leibniz (and Mariotte), such as Galileo’s, approached the breaking 
load of a gradually weighted wooden beam as an instantaneous catastrophic 
event. Leibniz’s consideration of internal elastic responses are linked to flexure, 
estimating gradual increase in internal stress that leads to material failure and, 
thus, relying upon sundry macroscopically-based constraints (i.e., “that beam 
movements transpire mainly along fibers and in plane sections”; 105).23 
We also now know that continuous matter exhibits the property of not 
becoming ‘simpler’ at smaller size scales that leads to foundational recess. 
Leibniz, like most all pre-twentieth century thinkers of physics, employed appeals 
to ideal and infinitesimally small elements. The unavailability of PDE 
representations forced Leibniz to approach flexible three-dimensional bodies 
through the aperture of one-dimensional ODE decomposition. Conceptually, 
Leibniz focused on materials that seemingly remain continuous and flexible on 
every size scale (vide classical continuum mechanics), treating physical 
description at the level of spatial points as idealized. We will largely concern 
ourselves with a different argument concerning downward scaling when setting 
up a differential equation modeling of PDE type, which involves the suppression 
of irregular events arising upon small scale sizes. 
A Hookean spring displays the simplest form of material teleology, as it 
immediately strives to return to its natural state in a manner that is linearly 
dependent upon its displacement from the condition in question. Thus, ‘spring-
like behavior’ is a central element to Leibniz’ mechanics, as it deals with 
continuum models. Wilson considers a complete and enclosed beam codified in 
 
22 In rheology, the science of non-Newtonian formation and flow, every ideally Hookean solid—ideally 
elastic—contains a specific and un-breakable identity within the surface of its body (which is opposed to the 
ideally dissipating Newtonian liquid that perpetually extends and reproduces its surface). 
23 George Boole's work on non-numerical algebra realized Leibniz’s dream of transforming reasoning into 
a calculus. 
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variational terms, carved into five equal finite length ΔL, allotted with five 
weights W, so as to examine how this ‘possibility space’, or ‘function space’, is 
variationally configured with the least overall bending. These weights act as a 
spring stretching within each element, exacting strain energy; the computational 
considerations we consider with this five-membered array of individual element 
configurations recall our previous reference to referential refocusing. A 
constrained equilibrium state represents a condition to locate an optimized state 
through experimental refocusing and corrective testing, where the optimally 
lowest tension configuration is the product of successive approximations. This 
search for a ‘relaxed energetic state’, which employs ‘variational’ reasoning, can 
be furthered by dividing ΔL into ΔL*-segmented possible elements of shorter 
length. Furthermore, we can relinquish ourselves of the weights and consider 
internal springs by assigning the bootstrapping procedure of formulating a 
continuous beam with an ersatz measure of “springiness determined by the true 
springiness within the segmented possibilities to which they lie near in our norm” 
(111). What this demonstrates is that real-world materials may appear to be 
smooth and thoroughly flexible but we can not obtain a computational handle 
upon their governing physics without simulating that these materials decompose 
into artificially curved (“kinked”) and less pliable elements; “[i]n other words, 
flexible beams need to be assigned a measure of springiness even though they 
contain no springs” (111). By diffracting a continuum model into partial 
differential operators, infinitesimal elements can then be assembled into a final 
ODE that describes the one-dimensional displacement of a target object from the 
x-axis. This formulation of a constrained equilibrium is entirely static as our 
relaxation space does not contain any possibilities which change in time, such 
that we can superimpose such dynamic behavior to Lagrange in keeping with our 
elliptic signatures. 
This beam formulation represents a downwards projected expression of a 
simplified ‘personality’, opening up questions regarding target materials and 
descriptive coherence. Our assumption of complete downward scaling is faulty 
for Leibniz did not assume that real-world materials behave identically at all scale 
sizes. As we know, if we observe wood or steel under a microscope, we see how it 
is comprised of:  
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 “a maze of cells or minute grains that individually stretch and dilate according to 
far more complicated rules than reveal themselves within larger hunks of the 
material. Small hunks of a beam no longer respond to pushes and pulls in a simple 
Hookean manner” (113). 
Because ‘nature does not make jumps’, the springs that we (artificially) 
designate to our elements must cohere and coordinate with their adjacent 
elements such that they will sum to a continuous variation at the macroscopic 
level—i.e., infinitesimal strains sum to macroscopic displacements. Leibniz’ 
thought shows how infinitival and extended modes of description harmonize in 
a non-trivial manner. It is precisely due to this coordination of  required compatibility and to 
underscore such harmonious cooperation that Leibniz writes about material such as wood or steel 
as ‘machines’. For Leibniz, calculus formulas represent downwardly projected 
generators of larger-scale behaviors.24 This is a view that we generally co-opt 
when considering the standard equations for classical continua of everyday life 
(e.g., beams, strings, fluids) wherein their validity is predicated upon the 
downward projection of homogenous patterns observed at large-to-middling-
scale lengths (114). 
Wilson explicates how Leibniz fits together his two critical facets of 
explanation, efficient causation and teleological explanation. Leibniz’s concern with 
efficient causation rests upon the fact that springs demonstrate the Hooke’s law 
propensity to return to natural rest state. Specifically, Leibniz endorsed Descartes’ 
“air sponge” theory of elastic rebound, noting that “even if some bodies appear 
denser than others, this is only because the pores of the former are filled to a 
greater extent with matter that belongs to the body, while, on the other hand, the 
other rarer bodies have the makeup of a sponge”; accordingly all “bodies of the 
universe” are “elastic, not though in themselves, but because of the fluids flowing 
 
24 Here, we can make a curious connection with Gilles Deleuze’s machine ontology. Deleuze’s overall theory 
of machines is fundamentally flat, discontinuous, and infrastructural, as Deleuzean externality is premised 
upon irreducibility. In opposition to Platonism, or internalism—which results from the private depth of 
machines being irreducible to and unique in kind from their actualizations—our fundamental error of 
thinking, according to Deleuze, is to conflate the contiguity, identity and resemblance characterizing 
actuality as also characterizing “things in themselves.” Therefore, “every entity is itself a machine, in the 
sense of being a causally effective agent that makes its own difference in the world” where each entity has 
its own unique “complex inner working.” See: Arjen Kleinherenbrink, Against Continuity: Gilles Deleuze’s 
Speculative Realism, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2019, p. 7. 
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between them, which on the other hand consist of elastic parts, and this state of 
affairs proceeds in infinitum.”25 Thus, wood retains a ‘memory’ of how its parts 
can be arranged properly by relying upon circulating pressure in surrounding air 
that is requisite to restore its material to teleologically desired natural equilibrium. 
Material such as wood acquire a ‘memory’ of its natural equilibrium state via 
efficient causation mechanisms, which, themselves, are non-teleological and rely 
upon geometry and conservation principles. As the underpinnings of ‘memory’ 
become evident in lower-scale manner, Leibniz employs a bottom-up description 
of the processes concerning efficient causation, which we can contrast to final 
causation that is constructed through differential equation modeling (e.g., beam 
behavior).  
Now, indeed, we must concede that time slips back in. The process air/tube 
wall interactions that restore the wood’s webbing to its rest state configuration—
where particles of air bounce off walls and interchange momentum—recall a 
proper account of billiard balls’ collision. Tube walls and billiard balls compress 
temporally and distribute original kinetic energy into internal energies of 
deformation. The inviolable axiom of continuity requires that nature can never 
allot abrupt leaps such as radical shifts in direction. Thus, elastic compressions 
quickly push the ball away from the wall in an altered direction while compressed 
bodies regain desired shapes or, in Leibniz’ parlance, their ‘material personality’. 
Solely “under the assumption that these compressive events occur swiftly within 
a brief time interval Δt* can we preserve the ‘inviolable axiom’ of continuity that 
requires that nature never make abrupt leaps such as a radical shift in direction” 
(115-116). Huygens and Wren’s approach to continuity approaches elastic collisions 
by omitting these Δt* interval events vis-à-vis the compression of hidden 
complexities into an instantaneous event that involves no distortion in these 
colliding bodies, accepting a discontinuous jump. It is through this instrument, of 
eliding Δt* events—or, qua Leibniz’, the (higher-scale) ‘final cause’ account—that 
we can explain the elastic behavior of the wooded beam in a purist (lower-scale) 
efficient causation manner that solely regards the “pushing and pulling of 
 
25 Ariew and Garber, Leibniz: Philosophical Essay, pp. 252-254. 
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contracting particles” and nothing else (117).26  
For Leibniz, the lower-scale efficient causing model (of air particles and pore 
walls) is speculative and parasites upon the ‘final cause’ account (of differential 
equations for reliable modeling), which is ultimately the more fundamental strata. 
Therefore, it is the final cause account “which is in fact deeper and in some sense 
more immediate and a priori”27 in comparison to the “primitive force or form of 
substance (which, indeed, fixes shapes in matter at the same time as it produces 
motion).”28 For Leibniz, these alternating levels of preferred explanation are 
exchanged and neither aperture is wholly accurate, as each approach rests upon 
minor details explicable exclusively from its rival’s perspective. This cyclic process 
repeats ad infinitum as we inspect matter upon lower ranges of microscopic 
detail, as “[o]ur little balls of air will themselves require pores through which an 
even finer air must circulate, which in turn will require pores of their own and so 
on […] in the manner of deMorgan’s celebrated fleas-upon-fleas analogy” (118-
119). Doddering through the labyrinth of the continuum, a verdant maze of 
never-stabilizing hierarchies and interwoven explanatory schemes, we see how a 
true ‘final cause’ narrative is always set in exchange with an ‘efficient cause’ 
description. 
How does free will make its way into this model? Much like Maxwell's demon 
designated the physical laws that govern the inert universe as separate from the 
human mind’s agency, repeating Descartes (and the providential direction of 
ambient air’s elastic material reinflation towards its original configuration), 
Leibniz posits a Deity that mimes the same role as this benevolent Demon. Recall 
 
26 Leibniz understood inclinations to be appetitive and, when treating final causes as motives, considered 
final causes as essentially appetitive in nature. In addition to involving a “mentally represented state of affairs”, 
“final causes” are “also constituted by appetitions, the most fundamental producers of efficient causal 
change.” This is why Leibniz’ final causes are a special species of efficient cause. For Leibniz, a final cause 
is a motive for action and, ontologically speaking, “a mental representation of a state of affairs for which 
there is an appetite or desire sufficient ‘to produce a complete volition’. Appetite (desire) is a constitutive 
component of the final cause (motive), for a mental representation alone is not a final cause, but a mental 
representation of some state of affairs plus an appetite for that state of affairs is a final cause, provided that 
such appetite moves the will”. See: Laurence Carlin, “Leibniz on Final Causes”, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 44, no. 2, 2006, p. 230. 
27 Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics” in Leibniz: Philosophical Essay, pp. 54-55. 
28 Ariew and Garber, Leibniz: Philosophical Essay, p. 254.  
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that we elucidated a beam’s behavior through the teleological appeal to ‘final 
causes’—the unstressed equilibrium conditions that wood and iron “strive to 
regain, with unique degrees of vim depending upon their elastic ‘personalities’” 
(119). For Leibniz, it is God who attends to final causation’s determined 
optimization via micro-mechanisms—if we examine wood at the scale level 
below its critical length ΔLc, whereby it no longer behaves in a homogenous 
fashion, “we will observe air bumping into pore walls within the wood along the 
exact efficient causation trajectories required to knock the distorted beam back 
to its relaxed shape” such that there is a “machinery of the world in such a way 
that […] the springs in bodies are ready to act of themselves as they should at 
precisely the moment the soul has as suitable volition or thought”29 and that 
“recoil must arise […] to conserve force” (120).30 This is Leibniz’ ‘pre-established 
harmony’ where behavior can be explained in a top-down manner according to 
final causation schemes which, themselves, can be understood in bottom-up 
fashion by virtue of efficient causation underpinnings.  
 Leibniz anticipates that there exists a non-trivial structural demand and this 
becomes registered in concrete mathematical terms with modern texts 
concerning continuum mechanics: unless catastrophic lower-scale events 
intervene (e.g., fracture), flexible bodies necessarily retain material coherence 
throughout all higher-size scales. By insisting that “figure is not even an entirely 
real quality outside of thought,”31 therein attributing space and time as merely ideal, 
Leibniz correctly observes that every practicable description of material matter 
utilizing geometrical vocabulary unwittingly incorporates a fair degree of 
fictitious projection to unwarranted scales. As a theory of ‘feigned homogeneity’, 
this description of extension proffers a presumption that any thoroughly 
continuous material can be infinitely divided into any scale length ΔL. In 
mathematical physics, for instance, if a beam is described as curved along a 
definite pattern (e.g., a catenary), lower-scale complexities are artificially 
suppressed for the sake of convenient representation in upper-scale behavior 
propensities. This provides for a scheme of supervenience where, if section A of 
 
29 Leibniz, “Letter to Arnauld” in Leibniz: Philosophical Essay, p. 84. 
30 Leibniz, Leibniz ed. Louis Alexandre Foucher De Careil, Paris, BiblioBazaar, 2008, p. 234. 
31 Leibniz, “Letter to Arnauld”, p. 343. 
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this beam is apparently “more strongly curved due to the weight pressing upon 
section B,” then we seem to also claim that A’s “powers of influence have partially 
come under the sway of B’s”, describing the latter by extending the (force of the) 
former (124). Thus Leibniz conceives of continuity via hierarchical relationships 
where “something prior”—that is, the persistence of an initial “force”—finds 
itself repeated or diffuse, acting upon or resisted, under the guise of (behavioral) 
extension.32 Despite this doctrine arguably overreaches, by utilizing it “fictitious 
‘possibilities of division’ can be exploited to provide a relaxation space pathway 
to differential equation models like our beam formula” (122).  
Of course, Wilson does not recommend we retain God’s optimization forces 
qua Monadism, wherein material behaviors require underpinnings within 
exterior reality. Instead, we can create a bridge between Leibniz’s harmonization 
requirements and the mathematical expression of additional compatibility 
equations, which insure infinitesimal relationship captures in our equations that 
account for stress and strain, integrating these coherently as supplementary 
demands on compatibility. Nonetheless, Wilson recovers a critical ambition from 
Leibniz’s ‘master-slave’ hierarchy, where teleological requirements of a ‘natural 
machine’ are determined in nested fashion, “[a]nd thus, a natural machine can 
never be absolutely destroyed just as it can never absolutely begin, but it only 
decreases or increases, enfolds or unfolds, always preserving […] some degree of 
primitive activity.”33  
Consider a continuous and coherent plank of wood where each component 
element at a critical ΔLC scale cooperates in “slavish fashion” with the “natural 
state desires of the beam as a whole” (125). Here, a small arc, a, of a wooden ring, 
A, is molded under tension such that it agreeably cooperates with the natural 
state “desires” of the whole ring A, but solely so long as a remains ‘enslaved’ to 
A. However, if ‘liberated’ from its ‘chains’–that is, if we cut the small arc, a, from 
the wooden ring, A–it displays a novel set of natural-state ‘desires’. Where Leibniz 
would argue that this top-down scaffolding organization within inorganic 
materials provides a simulacrum of the monadic master-slave relationships 
 
32 Leibniz, “Letter to Basnage,” in Philosophical Texts ed. and trans. R.S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press,  1998, p. 64 
33 Leibniz, “Of Body and Force” in Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, p. 253. 
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operative within living biological systems,34 we can naturalize this description vis-
à-vis behavioral coherence. 
The provident manner wherein Leibniz relates God’s ‘arranged’ construction 
of a ‘full universe’ around the desires of composite objects dominating our own 
scale-level35 also informs his description of human free will. Presented with the 
logic of a material’s possibilities of division, Leibniz provides two responses: (i) 
that these ‘possibilities’ pertain to granular monads of the ‘real universe’—this 
determines how one possible interaction is produced from the full ‘personality’ of 
determination(s) qua intra-monadic influence and cooperation; (ii) that these 
‘possibilities’ apply to a ‘smoothed-over’ continua that we attribute to the sake of 
the world for descriptive utility. According to (ii), the understanding of “‘being 
divisible into segments of length ΔL’ central to our beam modeling techniques 
merely represents a fictive aspect of our restricted upper-length scale knowledge, 
albeit a form of projection vital to descriptive success within mathematical 
physics” (127-128). As Leibniz describes, this demonstrates how the “science of 
continua”, or the “science of possible things” contains “eternal truths” or truths 
that are “never violated by actual phenomena, since the difference [between real 
and ideal] is always less than any given amount that can be specified. And we 
don’t have, nor should we hope for, any mark of reality in phenomena, but in the 
fact that they agree with one another and with eternal truths.”36 The elaborate 
continuum of the ideal, which contains indeterminate parts, is contrasted with 
the ‘actual’ where nothing is indefinite as, in these ‘actual things’, or ‘real 
substances’, every division has been made in advance.  
Thus unfolds Leibniz’s compatibilist doctrine of choice, a “freedom of 
contingency”37 where we are set into middle-level constraints of permittance: we 
have access to macroscopically smoothed-over terms and, therefore, hold 
operative notions of contingency and necessity that reflect this middle-scale 
placement. Any explanation of activity X is that we execute it from desire but 
 
34 We ought to note, however, that according to Leibniz every artificial/material system does contain a small 
measure of animal-like monads. 
35 Leibniz, Theodicy, trans. E.M. Huggard, Gloucestershire, Echo Library, 2005, pp. 157-159. 
36 Leibniz, “Letter to de Volder”, Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, pp. 185-186. 
37 Leibniz, Theodicy, pp. 148-149. 
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that there also exists the microscopic workings of God’s preplanned 
determination, of air particles shunting along our cranial walls, fomenting our 
neurons into excitation and us into action. Of course this is an exuberant fantasy 
but what we retain from Leibniz’s conception for our contemporary modeling 
policies is a conception of materials as flexible matter that tacitly rest upon subtle 
contextual controls. This gives us an alternative from the glib appeal to “the 
possible world of [point-mass] physics”38—and, in consequence, an ODE 
ontology—which lacks the necessary resources to render matter stable at the 
atomic level. 
§IV, "TWO CHEERS FOR ANTI-ATOMISM"  
Now let us provide a historically oriented approach to Pierre Duhem's 
methodological insights on continuum mechanics and thermal observations. 
Here, Wilson underscores the particularly prophetic structural assumption 
behind Theory T philosophical thinking that advances scientific theories of a 
‘fundamental physics’ cast by prodding the assumption that philosophy (of 
science/physics) should “capture the freely autonomous behaviors of nature within 
their mathematical netting” in advance (147). Wilson outlines Duhem’s alternative 
architecture of The Evolution of  Mechanics (1903) while focusing on scale-sensitive 
complexities that force ‘thermal’ terms such as ‘temperature’ and ‘entropy’ to 
obtain wide and effective referential ranges by advancing from one firmly 
established plateau to another via step-wise developmental arrangements.39 
 
38 The usage of ‘mass point physics’ in describing the classical rendering is, indeed, unique from Newtonian 
physics, despite the two are often conflated. As Wilson notes, “Newton did not endorse such an attitude, 
which was pioneered by later writers such as Christian Wolff, R. J. Boscovich, and the French atomists. 
Newton himself opined that matter was probably composed of extended rigid bodies surrounded by oceans 
of intervening fluid. To be sure, he (mostly) modeled the solar system as a collection of point masses in ODE 
fashion, but this policy does not justify assigning a point-mass ‘ontology’ to Newton’s thinking. Modern 
commentators frequently overlook the historical resistance to point masses (which prevailed throughout 
most of the classical era) because (i) they fail to compensate for the ontology-obscuring effects of the “physics 
always idealizes” appeals outlined in the appendix and (ii) they have been misled by contemporary 
instruction in “classical physics.” The latter took a decidedly ODE-favoring turn in the 1920s due to the 
formal requirements of quantum mechanics (129). 
39 With the Quine-Duhem thesis understand science as a system of statements that are locally connected 
with each other: “There are statements that are far from experience; they form the center of an imagined 
sphere. Those statements involve logic and mathematics. Located on the outer regions of the sphere, 
 EKIN ERKAN 591 
 
Through such developments, the “true significance of ‘temperature’ and 
‘entropy’ become contextually localized, in a patchwork manner” (138).  
This is contrasted to Theory T philosophizing, which fastens rudimentary 
‘natural kinds’ scenographies to these words (i.e., ‘temperature’ and ‘entropy’) 
and, therefore, underdetermines thermodynamic thinking’s contextual subtleties. 
Theory T thinking inherits a hex from the problem of the physical infinitesimal, 
wherein the complexities of arranging the dimensionally incongruent elements of 
continuum physics were smoothed over for the purpose of a functional manifold. 
This buoyed a lapse into ‘essential idealizations’ which maintain that a modeler 
much permanently misdescribe their targets so that the descriptive and 
philosophical enterprises of mathematical physics can subsist. 
While Wilson does not retain all Duhemain insights (setting aside the anti-
realist and phenomenalist Duhem), he focuses on the structural scientific 
problematic of constructing a workable (non-equilibrium continuum) 
thermodynamics “in which the notions of absolute temperature, heat, and 
entropy enter on an equal footing with the familiar qualities of standard classical 
physics (e.g. force, mass, potential energy, stress and strain)” (141). Circumscribing 
the thermal-free conceptual constraint of virtual work that informs Lagrange's 
method of undetermined multipliers (and Legrange's work on generalized 
coordinates), Duhem’s proposal is to further complement this ‘Old Mechanics’ 
with a richer ‘New Mechanics’ that also accounts for thermal phenomena. Using 
the formalism of Lagrange’s lower-level platform (in particular, its statics  
dynamics patterns),40 Duhem develops a thermal architecture attentive to how 
bidirectional forms of energy exchange occur within a dynamical setting.  
The core of thermodynamic thinking was originally taken up by Rudolf 
Clausius, who invoked entropy to codify coherent work capacity lost and 
regained. Clausius and those following him addressed the issues of energetic 
efficiency in large-scale blocks of homogenous material (such as gas in a flask), 
moving from one state of constrained equilibrium to another via external 
 
connected to the realm of mathematics and logic, are those statements that are in connection with 
experience. The scientific enterprise is represented by the structure of this web of belief.” See: See: Gerd 
Ch.Krizek, “A classification scheme for interpretations of Quantum Mechanics”, 2017, p. 31. 
40 Joseph-Louis Lagrange, Analytical Mechanics, Dordrecht, Springer, 1997. 
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manipulations (e.g., increased pressures or immersion within a thermal reservoir). 
The claim was that entropy, temperature, and other means of thermal 
classification applied to these stabilized end conditions and not to the transitory 
states during which material internally adjusts to its newly altered environment. 
Duhem’s New Mechanics program addressed energy exchange with respect to 
two-way entanglements situated within dynamical settings by proposing that 
Clausius’ thermodynamic considerations be applied at the infinitesimal level, 
where coherent energy and heat exchanges take place via heat transport.  
In contemporary philosophy of language, there are a number of 
misapprehensions concerning linguistic meaning that point o the semantical 
underpinnings of words such as ‘heat’ and ‘temperature’. Following Saul Kripke 
and Hilary Putnam,41 such ‘thermal words’ are categorized in ‘natural kind’ 
terms—herewith, such terms are prodded into referential alignment (e.g., 
“‘[t]emperature’ is held to referentially align with the mean kinetic energy per 
degree of molecular freedom contained within a target system”; 145). According 
to Wilson, “[p]roponents of natural kind stories generally underestimate the 
profound manner in which appeals to thermal concepts help us reduce the 
description of nature to tractable terms” (145). Consequently, the naturalized 
treatment of thermal concepts as such reduces their description of nature to 
tractable ersatz terms, slipping into "Fido"/Fido apriorism (the relational theory 
of propositional meaning that conflates the meaning of a word with the object 
that stands for it).42 
Consider, for instance, the distinction performed by the architectural task of 
factoring a system’s operative degrees of freedom when we connect thermal 
processes involving friction qua energy degradation: “as our pendulum swings 
merrily back and forth, a certain degree of frictional resistance systematically 
coverts some of this motion into heat” (146). Contra mean-kinetic-energy 
reductions (which open the doors to ersatz apriorism),43 energy degradation—
 
41 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980 and Hilary Putnam, 
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
42 Stephen Schiffer, "The 'Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief", Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 1, 1987, pp. 455-580. 
43 This creates a kind of conditional necessitarianism, wherein the “[n]atural kinds doctrine claims that the 
slogan ‘mean kinetic energy per degree of molecular freedom’ reports on the hidden ‘essence’ of 
temperature”, thus forging an “alignment between words and world”; by extending the “natural kind” to 
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crucial to decoherence events within quantum mechanics—stitches together the 
descriptive fabric. This does not occur within a simple two-stage process but 
along a hierarchical ‘cascade’ that is positioned via size-scales. Through these 
scale-centered stages, we will be able to implore the semantic complexities in 
thermal vocabulary.  
Those opposing Duhem’s position often point to a form of prospective 
thermal/mechanical integration which can be achieved by ‘consulting’ lower-
scale molecular modeling, wherein applicable dynamics appeal to understanding 
in purely mechanical terms (i.e., the kinetic theory of heat). In The Evolution of  
Mechanics, Duhem not only shows how these reductive tropisms disregard 
empirical obstacles (e.g., erroneous specific heats) but also that they partake in 
conceptual closures, intoxicated from liberally imbibing from the well of 
“instinctive knowledge”.44 Duhem constructs an applicational range for 
amalgamated thermodynamics in layered stages; in doing so, Duhem outlines 
four developmental platforms as prerequisite for the successful employment of 
thermal vocabulary, surveying the behavioral criteria that allows one to discern 
coherent energy storage from incoherent means, providing a mode to 
understanding why, exactly, the ‘natural kinds’ account fails to do justice to the 
true utilities of thermal vocabulary: 
“(i) Establish the constrained equilibrium states of purely mechanical systems 
following Lagrange’s virtual work policies in his analytical Mechanics. (ii) Following 
Carnot and Clausius, introduce a parallel statics for purely thermal vocabulary, 
again only for systems in completely constrained equilibrium. (iii) Following 
Lagrange once again and Willard Gibbs, lift these two forms of statics into less 
constrained forms of dynamics, which are then scaled down to an infinitesimal 
level. (iv) on the dynamical basis established under (iii), introduce the rates of 
quantity adjustment that allow us frictional effects to drain coherent energy out of 
target systems. Only at this last stage of conceptual construction can thermal and 
 
property identity, and thus introducing a homogenization parameter for interconnecting models that 
require scale-relative sensitives, “[s]implistic linguistic assumptions like the Putnam/Boyd doctrine greatly 
encourage the notion that ‘temperature’ has been referentially aligned with a simple ‘essence’ since its first 
inception” (146-147). See: Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London, Routledge, 1978, p. 20.  
44 Accordingly, such “instinctive knowledge is, after all, only a confused and unanalyzed pile of experimental 
givens acquired at imprecise periods of intellectual development”. See: Pierre Duhem, The Evolution of 
Mechanics, trans. Michael Cole, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthooff and Noordhoff, 1980. 
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purely mechanical cross-effects be meaningfully considered” (154). 
Duhem’s method to construct a unified thermomechanics capable of handling 
complex phenomena that resist treatment within traditional presentations of this 
subject is by starting with a tightly constructed systems S (i.e., textbook 
thermodynamics) and approaching fully autonomous trajectories S + SE via 
constructive ‘lifts’, or autonomous trajectories (e.g., the steady-state flow of a fluid 
around an obstacle),45 beyond the Clausius-conceived base manifold. This is 
principally achieved through Duhem’s conception of an enlarged New 
Mechanics—in particular, virtual work here maintains that a device’s special 
states of constrained equilibrium represent the circumstances in which a 
machine’s internal dispositions for acting against its environment can be exactly 
checked by an appropriate schedule of applied restraining forces (167). This shows 
how, within thermal contexts, potential energies comport with entropies.46 
Duhem’s central demonstration in multi-stage construction is that until frictional 
damage and other irregular effects enter a system S, S displays uniform transfers 
of conserved energy between a storage facility and another facility (e.g., a shock 
absorber), such that there exists direction-independent reversible behavior. 
However, friction mars this uniform exchange pattern, robbing the mechanical 
system of some of its kinetic energy, such that it no longer possesses the energetic 
totality of its original conditions. Despite we normally presume a device’s internal 
capacities for storing potential energy will not be damaged by friction, physical 
processes such as hysteresis or plastic flow damage internal energy capacity. 
 
45 In a formal scientific modelling system S, if S behaves non-autonomously, we seek the larger grouping, S 
+ SE that can evolve conjointly in fully self-contained means, “where the controls formerly exerted by SE on 
S now appear as effaced approximations to the fuller S + SE evolution” (161). The result is a phase space in 
which the autonomous time evolutions of our S + SE system is portrayed as a single point trajectory moving 
through a high dimensional space; as this concerns thermal circumstances, the “‘reversible trajectories’ 
belonging to S will crawl along a close neighborhood of the SE surface at an infinitely slow pace, whereas 
the heat bath and applied pressures of traditional thermodynamics will live within the static SE sub-
manifold” (162). 
46 Entropy, or the “Second Law of Thermodynamics”, is initially explained wherein the total entropy of an 
isolated system always increases over time or remains constant within an idealized reversible process. 
However, this only makes sense for “systems that have been allowed to relax completely after a fresh set of 
external controls has been applied”; both scenarios, of “isolation” and “autonomous increase”, are 
illegitimate when riven from the backdrop of non-equilibrium processes. See: Clifford Truesdell, Rational 
Thermodynamics, New York, Springer, 1984, p. 9.  
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Duhem thus adds further layers to his modeling architecture to accommodate for 
destructive friction-linked processes.  
Duhem’s analysis isolates central behavioral assumptions required to support 
applicational utilities of ‘heat’, ‘temperature’ and ‘entropy’, examining the stage-
like character of these foundations. Today, scientists describe the cosmological 
evolution of our universe as a congregation of temperature-governed regimes. 
However, since science can solely produce theories of ‘patchwork’ constructions, 
the philosophical-cosmological project of ‘possible worlds’ is increasingly suspect. 
Similarly, the ‘natural kinds’ reference obscures applicational complexities that 
locate descriptive terms such as “temperature” on supportive platforms of greater 
architectural complexity than current philosophy of language generally admits. 
Since its inception, the widespread employment of ‘temperature’ has been far 
beyond its thermodynamic scope, betrothen to the perhaps mistaken application 
of crediting solid objects with ‘temperature’, treating them via a single controlled 
axis rather than operating in diffracted fashion. As Wilson notes, the “real 
dilemmas of thermodynamic usage trace to the fact that attributing a meaningful 
entropy to a target S while S is still engaged in internal turmoil is quite 
problematic, but at the same time, the classificatory utilities of the word are 
directed to the changes in S brought about these same processes of internal 
turmoil” (186).  
In turn, we must reframe our semantic accounts such that they can more aptly 
deal with such concerns—as Duhem notes, “[i]n the course of a virtual change 
the values of [the state variables] cannot be regarded as functions of time [….] it 
is clear that any sequence of equilibrium states of a system, provided that it is 
continuous, can always be envisaged as forming a virtual change of the system.”47 
The ‘virtual’ aspects of these modifications prod descriptive interventions, as in 
the ‘restricted ensemble approach’ where, by limiting statistical mechanics via the 
inclusion of configurations consistent with metastable state considered we move 
through relatively elevated mesoscopic scales—the true sources of target-
behavior are thus found (e.g., in rubber, the higher-level ensemble required to 
 
47 Pierre Duhem, Commentary on the Principles of Thermodynamics, ed. Paul Needham, New 
York, Springer, 2011, pp. 93-94. 
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examine the true sources of its elastic behaviors are found not at the atomic levels 
of the atoms that comprise the polymer chains). 
When the natural ensemble of permissible variations is presented, we see that 
the ‘temperature’ extracted from the lower-scale collection may, indeed, differ 
considerably with the ‘temperature’ pertinent to its behavior at the polymer-chain 
level. The shared classificatory word ‘temperature’ supplies different evaluations of  material 
behavior upon different choices of  length scale, characteristic of modeling schemes which 
operate in multiscalar manners as earlier demonstrated. The success of a 
multiscalar scheme depends on its various sub-models, framed at unique choices 
of RVE scale, do not communicate with each other directly but through suitably 
homogenized messages. Thus, lower-scale details are converted into the coarser 
appearances that they present to a higher-scale size. The descriptive utilities of 
‘temperature’, ‘heat’, and ‘entropy’ need to be considered via material-response. 
The essential differences between ‘pressure’ and ‘heating’ reflect the degree of  coherence retained 
in the material’s response to particular exterior energetic effort.  
 In most solids, coherence-to-incoherence degradations transpire along 
trickle-down hierarchies linked to natural cause-and-effect relationships that arise 
between RVE scales. From a ΔLhigher scale point of view, “coherent motion has 
been lost to ‘heat’” while, at the Δlower level, “this same ‘heat’ may retain a fair 
amount of directional coherence” (191). Degradation occurs during the 
hierarchical cascade within a complex solid, necessitating that we localize 
temperature and entropic evaluations to codify how such losses occur via 
couched context sensitivities that explicate the coherence/incoherence 
relationships that act across RVE scales. This is highly relevant to linguistic 
adaptation: the semantics of the word ‘temperature’ is not equally beholden to, 
say, the rubber band and the iron rail as it is to the ideal gas; “[f]or such reasons, 
our thermal words must progressively locate their appropriate physical correlates 
through localized adaption” (192).  
§V, "THE GREEDINESS OF SCALES"  
Now we can outline working architectures of modern multiscalar modeling 
techniques to help us recognize the distortions and vagaries in ‘Theory T 
thinking’ or theory-as-approximation. In particular, here we focus upon the 
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difficulties involved in describing materials that reveal large amounts of 
significant structure at intermediate size scales (e.g., the structural features that 
distinguish one igneous rock from another, or the out-of-equilibrium formations 
that blacksmiths fold and beat into steels). For instance, consider the diamond’s 
long-lasting range of ‘frozen order’, wherein there exist strong energetic barriers 
within the diamond that prevent it from returning to low-pressure graphite, such 
that it has a long relaxation time. Similarly, most solid materials display very little 
inclination for maximizing their entropies. While mathematics undergoes 
considerable difficulties in capturing the ‘natural’ notion of a dominant behavior 
in precise terms, different scale lengths can take account of one another in 
dominant behavior within nature. 
Central to the varieties of liberation from such computational 
shortsightedness are the tools of set theory and differential calculus. However, 
these appeals also introduce descriptive exaggerations, as demonstrated in the 
Greediness of Scales problem. Mathematicians currently attempt to repair these 
descriptive lapses via asymptotic interconnections; as we detailed, in the absence 
of any profound rupture or fusing, pieces of any continuous body are firmly 
attached throughout their distortions. This natural condition is enforced by the 
fact that the organized integration of behaviors across all scale sizes is scaffolded 
in top-down manner, as characteristic of relaxation space constructions and 
modern measure theory. Simultaneously, however, complete scale invariance is 
apparent as other process become ‘secretly active’ below a cutoff level ΔLC. 
The Greediness of Scales is bolstered by its core objective, to highlight a 
critical technique of computational architecture—multiscalar modeling. Wilson 
underscores a process of regimentation, termed amalgamation, that culls the 
previously isolated subdomains of a model into interactive communication with 
the supervening domains. To do so, Wilson discusses a number of obstacles that 
relate to the employment of differential equation models, or puzzles of  scale, which 
revolve around the fractured and unequal ways in which physical information is 
registered at different choices of characteristic size. A central query thus emerges: 
how then can we consider discerning the Quinean figure of ontology, i.e., how 
do we formulate an explicit articulation of ontological commitments based on the 
value of a bound variable (commitments found in the range of values allowed for 
and governed by its bound variable). 
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To best articulate this problem, let us once again recall our choice case 
example of the steel beam. At the highest size scales—following Hookean first-
order linear approximation—steel stretches and compresses down to 
approximately 10μm. At 10μm, the grain structure within steel becomes highly 
pertinent, as these grain structures and their components begin to stretch and 
compress according to a more complex set of rules than larger-scale steel. In each 
of these component grains is contained a number of “laminate layers which rub 
against one another in complicated ways [….] until we reach the tiny crystal 
lattices of the molecular level, whose orderly patterns are interrupted by higher-
scale-irregularities called dislocations” (202-203). It is here that the differential 
equations that regulate behaviors nominally occurring the ‘infinitesimal’ level 
become central. The specifications relevant for the differential equations within 
physics are generally obtained by scaling higher-level behaviors downwards, until 
some simpler infinitesimal level is reached.48 Steel, however, presents a problem 
to such benchmark scaling assumptions, as its behaviors stop scaling as so 
expected at the cutoff of ~10μm. While small sections of steel behave more or 
less identically at all scale lengths above this level, to capture the component grain 
behaviors after 10μm accurately, we are required to model it in a more laminate-
based manner.  
What is the Greediness of Scales? As we will recall, while RVE-submodels 
can be examined on account of contemporary scientific observational-
measurement tools (and, in particular, advances in computer simulation that 
attempt to overcome the descriptive clashes we shall elaborate), it is the problem 
of data amalgamation that prevents “practitioners from profiting from this 
collective knowledge in a straightforward way” (203)49. This is because, using 
RVE scale-focused modeling via differential equations in bottom-down fashion 
(reaching towards the infinitesimal), amalgamation presents a conflict regarding 
the direct descriptive incompatibilities that arise concerning the same vocabulary 
with respects to properties that a material (such as steel) displays on small-scale 
 
48 This is well codified by the apothegm that ‘physics is simpler in the small’. 
49 This means that two scientists who model different select scale levels (of steel) can not simply posit their 
combined research results because it will result in syntactic inconsistencies where differential equation 
requirements overlap. 
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levels.50 
An issue arises on the differential terrain: differential equations that are 
appropriate to two such levels of sub-modeling necessitate that the narrowly-
constrained rules concerning stretching and compression must remain applicable 
down to the zero-length scale. Thus, the Greediness of Scales conflict is born due to 
syntactic disharmony: the differential equation model must account for all the 
lower-size scales available to reach the infinitesimal level, which is where 
differential equations articulate their stipulations. But, due to the syntactical 
discordance concerning the material’s behavior beyond a cutoff level, inconsistent 
claims about the very same part of material result. This may remind the reader 
of Sellars’ pink ice cube problem, where an ice cube’s color—which appears to 
be pink ‘through and through’, for it has been made by freezing a (pink) frozen 
drink—is observed as ultimately homogenous because it presents itself to us as a 
“pink continuum” in “all the regions of which, however small, are pink.”51 The 
concept of ‘pink’ thus demands that its applications scale continuously downwards to 
the infinitesimal level, wherein this ‘manifest image’, or the image of as it is plainly 
conceived of, is rationally set in contrast to what we know through scientific 
measurement or, in Sellars’ parlance, ‘the scientific image’. For Sellars, the pink 
ice cube of our experience is an object which, according to science, cannot exist 
as we conceive of it—our ‘manifest’ object-image is pink ‘through and through’, 
but once we consider that the ice cube is composed of H20 molecules, we 
contradict this, since those molecules are not pink.  
Sellars’ scope regarding the intentionality of acts of thinking involves a 
Kantian shift in focus from items of propositional content to intuitions. Per Kant, 
intuitions contain contents expressible by phrases that, themselves, are not the 
 
50 With crystalline materials, for example, at low-level scales we observe segments of perfect lattice bonded 
together around arbitrarily oriented boundaries. At scale levels above this point, RVE behaviors around 
the level of conglomerations are generally isotropic (the material responds to the same rules regardless of 
which direction it is pulled). While higher-scale response supports modeling whereby compression and 
stretching behaviors are governed by Young’s modulus E and the shear modulus μ, the “tiny slivers of 
crystal within these conglomerates will not stretch and compress in this simple manner, and RVE modellings 
appropriate to these tiny structures require five or six elastic modalities o capture their anisotropic behaviors” 
(203; emphasis added). 
51 Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" in Science, Perception, and Reality, New York, 
Humanities Press, 1963, p. 26. 
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content of a claim but express intentionality (Kantian intuitions are 
representations of this-suches, which have a predicative qualification built into 
them and locate the object within a classificatory scheme).52 This demonstrates 
how intentionality presupposes understanding; thus, “the intentional directedness 
of an intuition at reality—its being an intuition of, say, a pink cube—is to be 
explained by analogical extension from the way in which, given the presence of 
a demonstrative phrase, say ‘this pink cube,’ in a form of words uttered in a 
certain context, anyone who understands the utterance can identify a certain 
object as what the utterance is about.”53 The intentionality behind thought in 
understanding is, thus, regarded as partially constituted by the spontaneous 
cognitive power that, presenting itself as the understanding, is the faculty of 
concepts. A crucial mediating term between the scientific and manifest image 
distinction and the causal/logical distinction that critics like Bas C. van Fraassen 
have highlighted is normativity.54 Sellars considers norm governed behavior as 
causally but not logically reducible to regularities and dispositions. A critical 
difference between the scientific image and manifest image is that the latter is 
intrinsically normative, for it has at its core the conceptual repertoire of 
personhood, which Sellars considers inherently normative. The scientific image, 
 
52 Willem A. deVries, "Sense-certainty and the ‘'this-such’’" in Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit': A Critical Guide 
ed. Dean Moyar and Michael Quante, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 63-75. 
53 John McDowell,” Sensory Consciousness in Kant and Sellars”, Philosophical Topics vol. 32, no. 1-2, Spring 
and Fall 2006, p. 314. 
54 While Sellars attempts to carve a hard distinction between the vague concepts of ‘the manifest image’ and 
those determinate descriptions of ‘the scientific image’, critics such as Bas C. van Fraassen have responded 
that this doesn't hold because prior scientific theories often are vague and indeterminate in light of 
subsequent scientific theories, just as ‘the manifest image’ appears to the purported ‘scientific image’. 
Nonetheless, while Fraassen argues for the irreducibility of this incompleteness of the manifest image to the 
scientific image, for Sellars the point is that the vague concepts of the manifest image related to sensible 
qualities are not logically/conceptually reducible, but causally reducible to the scientific image. Fraassen 
might respond by pointing out that ascription of causal efficacy is theory-dependent, and there's always a 
choice of several different theories which describe causal mechanisms adequate to our observations. The 
history of science does not give us adequate reason to suppose that, in the ideal limit, we will reach some 
theory which is ultimately adequate in its causal description. Thus, Fraassen is burdened with further 
detailing an account of anti-realism with which to combat Sellars’ scientific realism as an account of 
causality sans theory-dependence lapses into the myth of the given; the Sellarsian benefits by being able to 
respond by giving an account of causality which is not theory-dependent, thereby supporting the terms of 
this discord qua realism. See: “The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image” in Einstein Meets Magritte: The 
White Book - An Interdisciplinary Reflection, eds. Diederik Aerts, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1999, pp. 29-52. 
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on the other hand, is premised upon the elimination of all such normative notions 
from our descriptive and explanatory frameworks. Thus, while the scientific 
image works out the causal reducibility of human culture in practice, the manifest 
imagine retains its independence as the site of the logical irreducibility of the 
norms governing this very practice. For Sellars, sensory consciousness is the 
primary product of sensibility which, itself, is populated by sensations that are 
describable and that poses relations to the subject as modifications of statehood; 
they lack intentionality and must be distinguished from that which has 
intentionality (i.e., experiences and intuitions are composites). Although Wilson 
is concerned with continuum physics and the stipulations behind a scale’s 
exacting a bottom-down monopoly—specifically as it concerns requirements of 
mass and stress—there is a homology here with Sellars’ concern regarding the 
“clash between images.”55 Thus, we shall navigate the Greediness of Scales 
problem sympathetic to the response that homogeneity is a feature that is 
represented, not a feature of the representing. As demonstrated by Wilson’s (and 
Batterman’s) work on continuum idealizations, scientific descriptions are often 
privy to Theory T committals ‘through and through’, treating that which is scaled 
down to the ‘definitely granular’ with the same theoretical presuppositions as that 
which is ‘definitively continuous’—thus, given a modeling scenario localized to 
the RVE level where previous scaling behavior fails, such scientific Theories are, 
strictly speaking, false (in a way analogous to the pinkness of the ice cube). 
The Engineer J.T. Oden has described the tyranny of scales problem by 
remarking that all simulation methods produced until the beginning of the 
 
55 For Sellars, this “relocation story” is not “simply a solution to the problem posed by mathematical physics. 
It is also an account of how we could come to be able to think about sense impressions in the first place. We 
come to be able to think about sense impressions of pink cubes by first thinking about volumes of pink that 
we seem to see, and then recasting the manifest pinkness as properties of perceptual states of ourselves.” 
See: David Rosenthal, “Quality Spaces, Relocation, and Grain”, in Sellars and His Legacy, ed. James R. 
O’Shea, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 153. Sellars' relocation picture necessitates that we conceive of 
sense-impressions as automatically conscious, whereby mental states' being conscious is distinct from the 
individual's being conscious. For Sellars, the central question of the grain problem was whether it could, in 
principle, be possible without a neurophysiological conceptual framework that defines states according to 
intrinsic character but proffers to epiphenomena. Wilson, on the other hand, is not interested in the 
homogeneity constraints satisfied by conscious presentational content but the syntactical overdetermination 
that this produces. 
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twenty-first century were valid solely for: 
 “[L]imited ranges of spatial and temporal scales. Those conventional methods, 
however, cannot cope with physical phenomena operating across large ranges of 
scale—12 orders of magnitude in time scales, such as in the modeling of protein 
folding or 10 orders of magnitude in spatial scales, such as in the design of advanced 
materials. At those ranges, the power of the tyranny of scales renders useless 
virtually all conventional methods.”56  
As eluded to earlier, modeling schemes have advanced to resolve such 
discrepancies by allowing RVE sub-modeling layers to circumscribe their 
descriptive agenda to a localized and semi-autonomous ‘strata’, or what Robert 
Batterman (co-opting the term from physicist Robert Laughlin) calls a 
“protectorate”.57 These semi-enclosed strata/protectorates are set into 
communication with one-another through those ‘coded messages’ called 
homogenizations,58 dividing linguistic labor and molding novel explanatory 
architecture. 
But when Oden relays dominant behaviors that appear on/can be captured 
on a characteristic size scale what, precisely, is he speaking of? Natural energy 
cascades and capacities for transmitting coherent work illuminates how material 
is characterized as such. If we pound a steel beam with a hammer, macroscopic 
energy spreads out in both directions and, if there is no interference/energy 
degradation, the waves will retain their shape. However, a distinct descriptive 
opportunity arises if we restrain the beam on two ends (e.g., as a guitar string is 
tethered on two ends), as the traveling waves are continually reflected back into 
the interior by the endpoints. After a period of initial relaxation time, these 
reflected waves often coalesce into standing wave structures, which represent 
 
56 J. T. Oden et al., “The Tyranny of Scales: The Challenge of Multiscale Modeling and Simulation” in 
Simulation-Based Engineering Science, Washington, DC, NSF Publications, vol. 5, 2006, §3.1. 
57 “The crystalline state is the simplest known example of a quantum protectorate, a stable state of matter 
whose generic low-energy properties are determined by a higher organizing principle and nothing else." 
See: Robert Laughlin and David Pines, "The Theory of Everything" Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 97, no. 1, 2000, pp. 28-31. As Batterman describes this more generally, 
the ‘protectorate’ is a domain of physics where behavior is independent of the microdetails found at small 
size scales. See: Robert Batterman, “Emergence in physics” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Abingdon, 
Taylor and Francis, 2010. 
58 These homogenizations are the very same ones that that we considered when dealing with relational 
propositional meaning in the 'Fido'-Fido theory of belief. 
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coordinated-across-the-beam patterns of movement that vibrate vertically and 
independent from one another. If this beam is thin, symmetrical and 
homogenous, than these standing waves appear as sine waves; if it is thicker, less 
homogenous, but still symmetrical, a less familiar kind of standing wave pattern, 
φi, appears, called an eigenfunction (these emergent φi modes create ‘energy traps’ 
by preserving “packets of energy over appreciable elements of time; 207). This 
last example shows a system’s dominant behavior factoring into independent 
behavioral modes through endpoint-induced coordination, where a target 
media’s large-scale behavior(s) are codified and captured through a smaller range 
of variables (φi) in comparison to the position coordinates (x) that track it. 
Why have we so arduously detailed this last example of the ever-peculiar 
‘standing wave’? Once such behavior becomes prominent with our rod of steel, 
we can appropriately assign ΔL, the characteristic scale length, because this is where 
the (differential) movement of a localized section is fastened into coordination 
with other elements—i.e., this is where perfected dominant behavior patterns 
emerge.59 Natural environmental boundary conditions/arrangements, such as 
coordinated endpoints (in our case, the ‘pinned endpoints’ of the steel beam-cum-
string), induce any φ-variable description with “across-the-entire-system 
coordination” (210). 
Let us now briefly consider behavioral difference according to different scale 
length. We say that plastic damage occurs in material, and thus a material is not 
perfectly elastic when RVE units distort so severely that their crystal formations 
are altered to an unrecoverable degree. In the case of such energetic cascade 
damage with our steel bar, from which we usually expect perfect elasticity, the 
responses at intermediate RVE levels fall out of coordination. The multiscalar 
computational scheme in question relies upon analyzing lower level scale 
behaviors in detail to assess intermediate scale damages.  
Let us also consider upper scale toughness (i.e., a material’s resistance to 
fracture) from a multi-scalar aperture. From a lower scale level point of view, the 
 
59 For the behavioral regimes where (horizontally) travelling waves remain dominant, the 
characteristic ΔL length is smaller, “determined by the breadth of the region in which the largest 
part of the disturbance occurs” (208). 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 604 
 
dislocation lines at a higher RVE scale appear to be uncoordinated and insignificant 
within the crystal lattice. But they move as a coherent group and, from a 
macroscopic point of view, such easily achieved movements shield underlying 
molecular bonds from shearing distortions. RVE units with plentiful dislocations 
retain dominant upper scale behaviors due to these dislocations, as these 
dislocation lines lessen the danger of fracture at the molecular lattice level. This 
is why steel with abundant dislocations is tougher than steel which lacks such 
dislocations—the latter often proves to be rather brittle, in fact. On a minute 
scale, dislocation movements represent structural damage—such is the 
becoming-macroscopic of microscopic damage vis-à-vis the history-dependent 
phenomena called hysteresis effect(s).  
Note that most computational multiscalar models attempt to imitate natural 
hierarchies within computational architectures. However, this suggests that 
hierarchies of characteristic scales solely reflect epistemic limitations upon our 
representational capacities—Wilson’s project toils to counteract this “by stressing 
the direct correspondence of dominant behaviors to objective issues of energetic 
transfer and degradation” (214). Thus, Wilson avoids the troubles haunting 
traditional top-down modelers such as Pierre Duhem, who tried to develop an 
all-encompassing macroscopic rule that accounted for effects of lower-scale 
complexity in single-level manner. The dichotomous bottom-up approach also 
lapses into the tyranny of scales intractability, prone to modeling error. However, 
“[m]ultiscalar techniques avoid this traditional top-down-versus-bottom-up 
dichotomy by pursuing hybrid policies that incorporate interactive modeling 
ingredients drawn from a wide range of intermediate RVE scales” (214).  
Let us now return to the problem of mutual cooperation, of fusing individual 
sub-models to one another while privy to the fact that RVE-focused protectorates 
necessitate differential equations for formulation. This is the case despite the 
descriptive ranges of such differential equations must reach all the way down to 
the infinitesimal, meaning that there will be clashes where descriptive demands 
are shared/intervene upon one another. In order to obtain, descriptive pathways 
must travel through infinitesimal levels of description, so we can not simply 
superimpose a cut-off policy and confine our claims to what happens at the ΔL 
level and above. The solution is in homogenization methods, which imitate energetic 
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hierarchies of dominant behavior relationships in nature. 
The inferential pathways here are those of an eigenfunction that locates 
important entrapment modes φi via a Fourier transform, which is predicated upon 
“an underlying differential equation modeling and then decomposes our target 
system’s superimposed complexities into the independent sub-behaviors 
associated with the φi spectrum” (216). At our cutoff ΔL level, this necessitates 
recourse to sophisticated decompositional techniques such as the Fast Fourier 
Transform, which extends elements of landmark intermediaries. This does not 
resolve how the infinitesimally poised differential equations operate inferentially, 
however, monopolizing al available scale lengths in order to draw such 
inferences.  
Another solution proffers: simple dominating patterns emerge from the 
collection of divergent behavior vis-à-vis mean and variance (these collective 
follies are collected under the Gaussian ‘bell-shaped curve’). We can bring out an 
asymptotic maneuver by ‘blowing up’, or inflating, sub-models to infinite 
population size, keeping the proportions of internal details intact. This asymptotic 
technique allots homogenization, which necessitates a particular kind of 
mathematical manipulation of imitating dominant behavior interactions. By 
examining a uniform stress environment we can move from the Representative 
Volume Element (featuring many randomly oriented grains) and homogenize 
these by shrinking grain sizes to 0 while keeping the energetic contributions of 
interior and interfacial bonds constant. This means filtering lower-scale modeling 
results in a manner that parallels how a characteristic scale level coordinates 
events arising within its lower-scale companions. A homogenization policy ably 
apes the physical manner in which relatively simple forms of dominating 
behavior, characterized by a limited set of descriptive parameters, emerge at 
higher scales from large, lower-scale underpinnings.60  
What do the relationships of interconnection in RVE levels within complex 
materials like steel look like at lower scale RVE units? Simple randomization 
(untethering hierarchical RVE interconnections) does not capture the proper 
descriptive complexity of relationships regarding interconnected RVE levels 
 
60 “Physicists dub the general phenomenon of complex behaviors that blur into higher-scale simplicity, 
universality” (219).  
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within complex material such as steel, precisely because lower-scale RVE units 
are often laminates or in “frozen disorder” crystal arrays. As Wilson notes, “a 
suitable homogenization technique must attend to both layer orientation and how 
interfaces are affected under distortion. Scale-based dependencies are not 
grounded in mere epistemology, as these homogenization policies of interstice 
behavior attempt to mirror natural energetic cascades which allow for a solid 
material to retain and eventually lose capacities for performing coherent work 
upon neighboring scales. Since mathematics is unable to supply us with dominant 
behavioral conclusions, assembling an effective computational architecture is 
tasked with an ontological gambit.  
In short, asymptotic relationships supply the essential stitching of 
communication-through-homogenization. The tyranny of scales problem 
demonstrates that hysteresis, the microscopic migration of dislocations that 
eventually results in material cracks—lower-scale damage inflicted by upper-
scale punishment—can not be illustrated with conventional computational 
modeling through single-level descriptive methods. While we cannot give an 
account of hysteresis by working upwards from the molecular scale in this mode, 
the multiscalar model evades such computational barriers by enforcing a 
cooperative division of descriptive labor amongst a hierarchy of RVE-centered 
sub-models, each of which is tasked with capturing dominant behaviors that arise 
within its purview. Therefore, “each local RVE sub-model directly responds only 
to its local environment, rather than to events that arise within distant sectors or 
upon alternative size scales” (222). There is a consequent step of mathematical 
filtering through homogenization after which we then readjust local parameters 
within each RVE unit until the cascade of interscalar reports is rendered self-
consistent. 
Returning to our beam of (pearlite) steel, let us picture it as a train track upon 
which a load-bearing locomotive stops on top of to load and unload cargo. After 
repeated sequences of loading and unloadings, the produced dislocations will 
collectively move close to the cementite walls, with these dislocations becoming 
entangled. As the capacity for protecting molecular bonds from the locomotive’s 
shearing stresses is lost, a “corrective message must be sent to higher sub-models 
reporting on this damage, demanding local corrections in the key parameters of 
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these models”, forcing a stiffening and a lowering of estimated fracture strength 
(224). As the repeated locomotive poundings eventually result in the rail’s 
dislocation at higher-sale behaviors, making the steel more brittle, parameters in 
our higher RVE sub-models must be adjusted to reflect these damage reports 
from below. Afterwards, we need to execute our original finite element stress 
calculations repeatedly so as to ascertain what effects local patches of damaged 
material may have on the rail altogether—this process is iteratively repeated until 
a self-consistent answer is reached, whereby our individual RVE sub-models 
reach descriptive harmony with one another (i.e., homogenize). This self-
consistency amongst dominant behavior protectorates at a variety of scale sizes is 
a hallmark of the multiscalar technique. Each corrective message sent at other 
RVE scales employs the language of classical continuum physics in compatible 
modes. If we simply combine every sub-model’s output as per Quinean 
amalgamation, syntactic inconsistency ensues. By processing every sub-model’s 
narrow conclusions through one of the homogenization filters, thereby enlarging 
the local model to an infinite population and extracting the desired parameter 
corrections through classic ‘mean and variance’ asymptotics, we consolidate 
communication. While single-level modeling attempts fail, our computational 
policies imitate the relationships of physical breakdown in behavioral patterns 
prevalent at lower-scale size sizes ∆L* that eventually grow into substantive 
effects with serious repercussions for this ∆L*, a type of “trickle-down 
architecture” (226).  
Uniquely, this strategy of multiscalar analysis begins with empirical 
observations rather than those derived from molecular fundamentals. Thus, 
outputs of multiscalar modeling supply mixed level explanations. Where 
nineteenth philosophy of science was divided between “rari- and multi-constant” 
approaches to elasticity, multiscalar techniques represent a deft compromise 
between purist top-down and bottom-up methodologies (226-227). Unlike 
Quine’s amalgamationist asseverations, these RVE sub-models—which 
communicate with the other RVE units through homogenized messages—do not 
attempt to reach any univocal ontic account to describe what is going on in the 
material. In comparison to the conventional bottom-up methodologies of 
traditional statistical mechanics, our multiscalar sequencing vis-à-vis a linked 
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equilibrium communication provides a rich descriptive mapping. A common 
criticism of multiscalar modeling is that it is difficult to determine the operative 
parameters at hand regarding its ‘first principles’.61 However, this is an incorrect 
categorization as the complex computational architecture that we are dealing 
with is an assembly of localized forms of constrained equilibrium sub-models, 
“linked together through homogenized relationships that have been selected to 
imitate the cross-scalar dependencies found within the target material” (232). 
Thus, the structural contents of these modeling practices does not conform to 
some initial value problem and its concomitant bottom-up expectations, as 
higher-level empirical observations are incorporated within our explanatory 
architectures. 
The implications of the Greediness of Scales dilemma is widespread. As an 
engine of effective inference, the applicative range of interior modeling formulas 
as such must be extended beyond the reaches of descriptive applicability, down 
to the infinitesimal. In order to contend with descriptive distortions, multiscalar 
methods impose corrective filters qua homogenization, with these compensatory 
tactics prodding patches of RVE modeling to cooperate with one another fluidly 
and profitably (234). This integrated framework has a deep-seated implication: 
“we can no longer regard each individual sentence within the encompassing 
scheme as directly ‘capturing the entire truth’ about nature’s relevant activities” 
(234). The descriptive merits of any multiscalar modeling necessitate that 
distributed implementation, rather than interior equations alone, be recognized 
in order to comprehend explanatory strategy. The sub-models within a 
multiscalar modeling scheme provides us with a treatment of manifolds. A fruitful 
analogy is the atlas-of-charts mode recalled in the parable of a group of blind 
men touching and reporting an elephant’s various body parts, with these local 
bits of information comprising ‘understanding’ solely when they are woven 
together in pragmatic fashion (i.e., the homogenization of data registration). 
Thus, we generally obtain our differential equation models by artificially 
extending higher dimension scaling rules down to the infinitesimal scale-level, 
despite being entirely aware that these behavioral assumptions fail at the lower-
 
61 Gene Mazenko, Fluctuations, Orders and Defects, New York, Wiley, 2003, pp. 57-58. 
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size scales—for instance, the isotropic scaling behaviors of “well-made steel fail 
when we reach the level of its component grain, yet we relentlessly plow past these 
limitations in setting up the standard modeling equations for our subject” (273). 
§VI, "BELIEVERS IN THE LAND OF GLORY”  
Here we critique contemporary metaphysics' tacit reliance upon the course 
categories of Theory T thinking, which has "misdirected philosophical attention 
away from the puzzles of applied mathematical technique that originally 
concerned Leibniz" (xv). The term ‘cause’ serves, at least partially, as a central 
instrument of linguistic management insofar as we utilize it to arrange component 
strategies within an extended reasoning process. Such applications endow ‘cause’ 
with robust physical content (e.g., the ‘causal processes’ involved in wave motion) 
but we can consider, with equal prudence, a scenario where the majority of 
customary physical referents are relinquished through mechanical constraints, 
leaving behind a pure exemplar of procedural significance.62 
Analytic metaphysics has, following David Lewis, been prodded into 
considerations regarding the early a priori, wherein there is a quasi-Kantian 
expectation that metaphysical categories exist which serve as fundamental 
prerequisites of descriptive thought. The first of these is ‘genetic on consideration’, 
and emphasizes how, via linguistic training, we learn to reason about ‘parts’ and 
‘wholes’, ‘causes’ and ‘effects’. Relying upon such categories, we scaffold 
inferential skills. Thus, in parsing the concept of mereology—the branch of 
classificatory doctrine that is apparently demanded by our conceptual rendering 
of ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’—philosophers such as L.A. Paul pose a necessitarian 
position concerning ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ wherein: 
 “the metaphysics tells us what it is to be a sum or physical object composed of 
these structured arrangements of parts, and thus tells us how the physical object is 
metaphysically constructed (composed) from its parts. In contrast, chemistry tells 
us what some of the parts and the arrangements of the parts are for different kinds 
of molecules, and it also tells us how to causally manipulate the world in order to 
 
62 Wilson delineates a sewing machine with complex parts where the circular motion on the right-hand 
crank is converted into back-and-forth motion at the highest extremity suitable for sewing machine stitching; 
in this example, there are two mechanical pathways that lead to a triangular piece, making it difficult to 
visually extrapolate whether this piece will turn clockwise ore counter-clockwise. 
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bring such arrangements into existence”.63 
Other analytic metaphysicians cite future scientific development rather than 
the prerequisites of knowledge formation wherein metaphysics is considered to 
be purely “speculative, and rarely if ever results in certainty” contrary to 
“continuity with science”.64 Wilson’s position is closer to Paul’s, whereby the 
vocabulary we use to explicitly distinguish cases and reorient behavior 
necessitates that we have a vocabulary of language management. On the other 
hand, Wilson identifies Sider’s position with Theory T thinking, as it suppresses 
the importance of the contextual complexities in the linguistic tools of 
management and architectural subtleties therein. Accordingly, the terminologies 
with which we can articulate novel reasoning architectures to ourselves and 
others who may benefit from learning these routines are necessarily entangled in 
functions concerning multiscalar architecture qua the fulcrum of change (as is the 
case when concerning questions like“‘[w]hen the small parts of granite 
recrystallize, what changes do these cause on a macroscopic level?’”; 243). 
Accordingly, we require linguistic tools in order to manage architectural subtleties 
of the languages we speak. Here, Wilson’s claim concerning the pragmatic factors 
driving language in progressive fashion is in keeping with Quine’s derision on the 
“analytic and synthetic”65 although novel in its structural conception.  
The word ‘cause’ adjusts to its semantic bearings as we move from one 
explanatory architecture to the next, contingent upon descriptive architectural 
adjustments. Recall that differential equational models that capture genuine 
causal processes generally possess a formal feature, or a hyperbolic signature, 
which is within those equational sets that capture non-evolutionary physical 
circumstances (“such as equilibrium condition[s], generally of elliptical 
signature”; 245). Thus, physics has a need for considerations regarding ‘cause’ 
when modeling equations that seek to accurately capture evolutionary 
developments as they unfold in causal processes. In order to do this, we 
 
63 L.A. Paul, “The Handmaiden’s Tale,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 160, 2012, p. 3. 
64 Theodore Sider, “Introduction” in T. Sider. J. Hawthorne, and D. Zimmerman, eds. Contemporary Debates 
in Metaphysics, Hoboken, Wiley-Blackwell, 2007, p. 18. 
65 W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in From a Logical Points of View, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1980. 
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characterize causal processes according to ‘finite difference’, characterizing 
infinitesimal relationships within differential equations in terms of finitary 
spatiotemporal ‘steps’. 
As it concerns these ‘early a priori’ childhood acquisitions, we begin to speak 
of nature’s causal processes in terms of finite difference. Rendering such finite 
differences into language means turning these into the Humean propositions of 
‘cause now, effect later’. Wilson characterizes those co-opting the Humean 
framework of inference as “calculus-avoiding philosophical descendants, who 
pressure […] that the ‘laws of nature’ invariably take the form ‘for all x and all t, 
if F(x) holds at t, then G(x) will hold at t + Δt’” (246). True causal processes are, 
however, captured in terms of differential equation relationships that we can only 
approximate if  we do not possess the appropriate calculus. However, this does this mean 
that we agree with Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell’s critiques on ‘cause’, as both 
philosophers fail to contend with Jacques Hadamard’s distinction between 
elliptical and hyperbolic signatures. 
When, for instance, the energy input into a violin string remains trapped 
within travelling wave-front packets, ‘cause’ is shaped along time’s progressive 
forwards-arrow, allowing us to co-opt a straightforward evolutionary modeling. 
But with real strings energetic confinement does not smooth out into standing wave 
patterns. Rather, “smeared out pulses continue to travel back and forth across 
the string for appreciable periods” where “the applied work across the entire 
string” is redistributed in a manner that, after a short relaxation time, sees input 
energetic resettlement such that we can characterize the string’s movement as a 
“superposition of standing wave patterns that retain their individual energies for 
significant periods of time” (248). This altered representation returns us to Fourier 
analysis, where there is a shift of basis vectors within a common descriptive 
arena—moving from a position representation to energy representation, with a 
change in descriptive basis representing coeval adjustments in reasoning 
architecture. Fourier factoring demonstrates how the real string, in the absence of 
energy dissipation, cycles through a number of simple processes independently 
of one another.  
In order to consider the varied vibratory modes of the string at ‘turnaround 
points’, or those points when stored energies are expressed completely in a 
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potential manner, we need to relocate string calculations through potential 
energy vis-à-vis an eigenfunction problem. This culls a different explanatory 
landscape wherein we no longer are concerned with ‘time’ at all but, merely, 
configurations of maximal potential energy (which is not contingent upon time 
but, instead, energetic storage capacity). In order to consider this, we need to 
adjust our computational strategy as a control problem rather than as an initial 
value problem, applying standard separation of variable techniques. This kind of 
adjustment is accompanied by a shift in how the word ‘cause’ shifts, as it is no 
longer attached to any evident ‘causal process’ in the evolutionary modeling 
manner.  
Specifically, when we are speaking about the least potential energy calculated 
according to curvature, invoking a description of a string in a Fourier-like way, 
our causal attention shifts to features of the central control variable involved, 
where questions of cause are contingent upon changes in variables such as angle 
changes. These are called manipulationist counterfactuals, where the outcome of 
various potential manipulations is centered upon target variables that proceed 
processually.66 A change in strategic focus, or instruction, accompanies an 
adjustment in the appropriate questions associated. This admixture is 
characteristic of guiding terms such as ‘cause’ and philosophers such as James 
Woodward have examined the manipulationist concerns involved.  
The Fourier paradigm is particularly seductive because of its “strong physics 
avoidance virtues—the invariant nature of our string’s modes allows us to push 
most issues of temporal development off the table and to concentrate instead 
upon the time-removed question of what the system’s eigenfunction modes will 
look like when frozen into their positions of pure potential energy” (252). 
However, causal process, as it applies to continuous wave progression as we 
originally examined (the wave motions which carry a violent string forward in time 
from one state to another) inherently deal with temporal developmental processes. 
This is a product of our ‘early a priori’ training concerning the developmental 
etiology of ‘cause’—we progressively deal with target variables such as 
counterfactual construction, causation, and manipulations, which are refined 
 
66 Woodward discusses how a ‘cause’ operates in accordance to manipulationist conditionals that arise from 
a wider set of operative circumstances. See: Making Things Happen, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 EKIN ERKAN 613 
 
over time through mixing linguistic instruction with factual report qua reasoning 
judgment (e.g., we can solve the problem of maximal potential energy shapes that 
‘cause’ a refined preserve energy via shooting method trials, locating distinct 
eigenfunctions according to the number of times they cross the x-axis.). As in 
Woodward’s oft-overlooked analyses on manipulationist conditionals, effective 
techniques concerning counterfactuals depend upon the inferential methods 
regarding specialized search spaces.67 
‘Cause’ performs a different function with respect to linguistic instruction 
than with factual reporting. Temporally deracinated, the word ‘cause’ no longer 
attaches itself in the temporal manner of a wave traveling along a violin string. 
Instead, its focus becomes at least partially architectural, concerning how 
alterations arising within a modeling format ⍺ (Δlower) can be matched to 
alterations that appear within modeling format β (Δhigher). Such is also the case 
with the use of ‘cause’ in multiscalar modelings (e.g., adjustment in the stresses 
around the mineral grain within granite can ‘cause’ that portion to shear 
elastically or recrystallize). Such multi-layered reasoning architectures mimic 
reasoning policies found in nature, with collections of linked sub-models centered 
around various scale lengths and communicating with one another via 
homogenization techniques, rather than through the straightforward 
amalgamation of data. Enforced changes on scale level Δlower affect behaviors on 
scale level Δhigher according to adjustments in stress that affect elasticity 
adjustments. As it concerns distinguishing granite from pumice on the 
macroscopic scale, lower-scale adjustments manifest themselves by shearing 
elastically (behaving like standard granite) or transmuting into gneiss 
(recrystallization); pumice, which lacks significant lower scale grain, has an 
architecture that requires counterfactuals of a similar type but also contains many 
 
67 This is opposed to Nelson Goodman and Stalnaker’s Theory T thinking, where significantly 
distinct forms of explanatory architecture are collapsed into the format of as an initial value 
problem sans reliability-enhancing homogenization (the helpful kind of ‘physics avoidance’) and 
salient modeling equations are endowed an evolutionary character of hyperbolic signature. See: 
Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983. 
Robert Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals” in Nicholas Rescher, ed., Studies in Logical 
Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, 1968. 
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trapped gas bubbles that can erupt when their obsidian walls melt under higher 
temperatures. As in the example of thermodynamic effort, which positions a 
crucial distinction between coherent and incoherent effort, the notion of 
controlled manipulation is central to conceptual endeavors such as how a spring’s 
original coherence responds to macroscopically manipulated push or pull with 
increased internal pressure—etiological question arise, such as “how much of a 
specified manipulation will cause an increase in pressure and how much will cause 
a rise in temperature?” (258; emphasis added). Through the collection of cross-
scalar counterfactuals of the same general type—that is, a compilation of reliable 
Woodward-style counterfactuals adequate to the computational architecture we 
should employ—we are able to address questions concerning the principles that 
dictate ‘causal’ change by grounding our laws in counterfactual claims.  
The type of autonomous causal processes of the sort typified by wave motion 
do not invoke control variable considerations. Thus, we are not claiming that 
‘cause’ necessitates an induced manipulated change at lower or higher size scale. 
Rather, the specializations that we are concerned with are related to reasoning 
stratagems that are applicationally and circumstantially ‘mixed and matched’ 
according to early a prior training modules. The rigid requirements pertaining 
to how ‘causes’ relate to ‘effects’ depends on local architectures and distinctive 
bonds between word-and-world, just as “the strength of the thread does not 
reside in the fact that some one fiber runs through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibers”.68 
According to Paul and fellow analytic metaphysicians, whose position opposes 
the rigidified semantics within contemporary philosophy of language, during our 
early a priori training we attach a central ‘meaning’ to ‘cause’, with firm 
extensions in all ‘possible worlds’. The essential pattern of word/world(s) 
attachments takes such shape, and thus we, in agreeance with Quine’s naturalist 
portraiture of linguistic development, reject the necessitarian assumptions of 
standard semantic essentialisms. However, this does not mean that we also ought 
not to be critical of how Quine is privy to Theory T thinking at times as well, 
grounding counterfactual claims in scientific laws. Thus, Quine is partial to the 
 
68 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, §67. 
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Gaussian patchwork where early a priori verities can collapse under inferentially 
patterned adoptions: 
“Operating as a term of mixed descriptive and management import, the word 
‘cause’ tags along with the architectural decisions we make in adapting established 
strands of parent reasoning into strategically modified sons and daughters. 
Borrowing terminology from the mathematicians, we can say that the newer 
employments represent natural continuations or prolongations…” (260). 
Wilson gives us good reason not to reduce every explanatory setting to 
evolutionary modeling circumstances, as those analytic metaphysicians who 
overlook the fact that counterfactual claims “make perfectly good sense within 
explanatory circumstances that are equilibrium-center or which eschew direct 
consideration of temporal consideration through other means” are writ to do 
(265). Insofar as Paul’s emphasis on early a priori considerations is concerned, 
Wilson’s objection to her defense of analytic metaphysical doctrine is rooted in 
the fact that her means of improving descriptive practice rests upon tearing our 
inferential doctrines away from the simpler demands upon which they were 
originally formed (267-268). Rather than appeal to a Theory T “fundamental 
theory” of futurist appeal, as philosophers such as Ted Sider do, Wilson denies 
distinctions that rely upon ‘perfectly natural properties’, ‘internal versus relational properties’ 
and ‘counterfactuals sustained by explicitly articulated laws’. This is precisely why Wilson 
takes such arduous time to make the case that the history of classical mechanics 
is characterized by a dependable resistance to suggesting plausible ‘laws’ 
regarding the basic cohesion of solid matter, preferring to co-opt the more 
metaphysically reliable “dodge of relying upon constraints and allied evasive 
crutches” (268). 
What do differential equations within our science teach us about classificatory 
concepts? First and foremost, and in agreement with the inferentialist 
Hegelianism of Robert Brandom, statements of scientific law should be 
understood as making explicit something that is implicit already in ordinary 
empirical descriptions of how things are. Such equations are not directly 
anticipated within the subject’s pre-assigned syntax (thus the necessary task of 
‘making explicit’)—the law is present in appearance, but it is not the entire 
presence of appearance. Under unique circumstances, the scientific law of nature 
has an ever different actuality; the laws of nature determine how things actually 
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interact only when supplemented by actual boundary conditions, or applications. 
In fixing which antecedents are factual, lawful necessity is expressed under actual 
conditions, which single out some of those hypotheticals as worthy of detaching 
conclusions from.69 Considering the Fourier-style characteristics of an uneven 
string, the decompositional traits capture basic behaviors of the string in a direct 
manner despite differential equation vocabularies’ ‘recursive orbit’ rarely 
captures terminological specificities; these are, instead, born from the “fixed 
point limits of holistic approximations, whose existences must be established by 
set theoretic means” (270). Despite, as made clear by the Greediness of Scales 
problem, we do not regard differential equations, themselves, as positing directly 
descriptive accounts of physical behavior(s) below a cut-off level where scaling 
assumptions fail (instead regarding formulas as convenient bottlenecks of 
descriptive overextension as we search for tractable conclusion), Fourier-like 
models obtained from such infinitesimal seeds demonstrate that target systems’ 
reliable characteristics, as these are captured upon a macroscopic, dominant 
behavior basis. Our string’s modal properties do not obtain status as ‘important 
traits’ from laws or differential equations in and of themselves, but, instead, from 
the means through which such interior considerations provide bridges to 
boundary conditions, interfaces, basic modeling assumptions, and, more importantly, 
unformalized appeals to dissipation, relaxation times, and steady-state conditions. That is, 
Fourier string modes obtain descriptive centrality by way of the vibrating string’s 
endpoints—continually redirecting traveling wave energy back towards the 
interior—which couples with relaxation time dispersion. Such boundary 
condition behaviors designate unique physical factors, which are registered 
within the interior string equation. Without taking account of such operative 
cooperative partnership, the string loses its capacity for storing energy in standing 
wave containers. 
Leibniz’ metaphysics is similarly concerned with descriptive overreach in 
differential equations. For Leibniz, differential equations do not directly reflect 
physical reality naively but require being parsed “in a manner that accurately 
recognizes the expressive limitations of the tools of applied mathematics. The 
 
69 Robert Brandom, A Spirit of Trust, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2019, pp. 189-190. 
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metaphysical entities he [Leibniz] reaches via these reflections are his strange 
monads” (272). While we do not endorse such monads, Leibniz’ interpretative 
problem is still with us, as we cannot extract a plausible ontology from physical 
doctrine in the straightforward syntactic manner that Quine70 and others posit 
(in their Theory T modalities). Appealing to the terms of Sider’s ‘internal’ and 
‘relational’ property distinction elides the critical importance that 
homogenization and allied techniques play in supplying mathematical surrogates 
for the environmental and interscalar relationships that determine how natural 
behaviors on varied length scales unify. What are the considerations to be privy 
to when concerning cooperation-of-linguistic-labor? 
Syntactic labels that we assign to significant physical behaviors “often derive 
from the mathematical terrain in which the advantages of strategies like factoring 
are clearly registered […] rather than first appearing within the grammatical 
orbits directly spawned by the original differential equation modelings” (276). In 
Galileo’s description of triangles and rectangles,71 boundary region ascriptions do 
not accord with differential calculus tools used to describe their interiors—the 
corners concentrate stresses, undercutting the validity of the interior equation. 
Nonetheless, the idealized notion of perfect triangles also facilitates many helpful 
reasoning practices that we are barred to otherwise. To solve this, scientists since 
the 1950s have invoked functional analysis corrections to continually confront 
such discrepancies–Theory T thinking is oblivious to such cooperative repair due 
to its static conception of ‘ontology’.  
As Wilson notes, “Paul’s emphasis on early a priori learning properly directs 
our attention to the linguistic question of how we competently manage a wide 
variety of differently strategized explanatory schemes” (278). Our disagreements 
with Paul are at the level of Paul’s rigidified semantic assumptions, which presume 
that words like ‘cause’ retain a constant and metaphysically analyzable ‘meaning’ 
throughout all of its helpful ministrations—following Wilson and other critics of 
permanent necessity (which includes Quine), we reject this premise. Sider does 
not repeat Paul’s mistake; instead, Sider makes a range of Theory T assumptions 
 
70 Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980. 
71 Galileo, “Selections from ‘The Assayer’” in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, ed. The Essential Galileo, Indianapolis, 
Hackett, 2008. 
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concerning how predicates that are posited within science are stratified 
hierarchically with respect to ‘importance’. According to Wilson, such a static 
position “locks science with a conceptual straitjacket that fails to account for the 
subtle adjustments at the core of its improving practices” (278). We can remedy 
Sider’s conception of metaphysics as pre-scientific enterprise and a necessitarian 
doctrine that rests upon syntactic convictions and a hypothetical ‘final physics’ 
by affirming Woodward’s manipulation conditionals. In unison with Wilson’s 
robustly adaptive semantic pragmatism, we pronounce that referential ties to the 
natural world ultimately are rooted in language’s practical entanglements with it, 
in action-enjoining contextual manners which frequently employ complex modes 
of data registration.  
§VII, "IS THERE LIFE IN POSSIBLE WORLDS?"  
We ought to approach causation in ‘possible worlds’ by examining the dappled 
nature of practical considerations that are contingent upon rationalizing appeals 
to counterfactual possibilities within effective science. In doing so, this essay 
creates a bricolage with Wittgenstein's later thought. As we noted earlier, 
Lagrangian descriptive tactics codify constrain-based higher scale knowledge in 
the form of virtual manipulationist conditionals (e.g., “[if] child i is moved 
through a vertical distance δ in a virtual manner, this manipulation will cause X 
amount of opposing work to arise as a reaction on behalf of the rest of the system”; 
265). Lagrangian techniques collect such specific forms of assertion into 
‘possibility spaces’/’function spaces’ which guide reasoning through improving 
approximation techniques until counterfactuals are framed by equilibrium (based 
on the inductive enlargement of experimental results). 
In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke describes “possible worlds” as little “more 
than the mini-worlds of school probability blown large”.72 If we take two six-faced 
dice, there are thirty-six possible states, with only one actual outcome; all the 
others remain relegated to the realm of possibility. Scott Soames opens these 
contours onto the globalized view of possibility, wherein “[a] possible world is a 
possible world-state—a way that everything could have been. It is, in effect, a 
 
72 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 16-18.  
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maximal property that the universe could have had.”73  
In Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, there is a particular focus upon the precept that 
logical possibilities comprise a well-defined collection over which a competent 
speaker possesses an absolute and wholly a priori command. However, in 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein appears to believe that the variegated 
appeal to the ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ are localized and revisable insofar as 
proper characteristics are concerned, meaning that the difference between the 
‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ is located in the contours of our present forms of life—
that is, “the phrase ‘logical possibility’ represents something of a misnomer 
because the underlying motives for erecting a local possibility/function space will 
typically vary from quarter to quarter and display little of the shared 
commonality that the modifier ‘logical invites’” (289). Thus, we have no reason 
to presume that circumscribed spaces can be sensibly combined into those 
aggregate Kripke-like completions. Accordingly, philosophical expectations 
otherwise rest upon a substantive misconstrual of the pragmatic utilities that 
localized talk of possibilities commonly facilitate.  
In order to observe how these misconceptions operate, we can examine 
counterfactual conditions that comprise contemporary metaphysics. Consider, 
for instance, sentences of the form ]if A is altered in manner B, condition C would 
result’—this encourages an inflation the likes of David Lewis’ grounding relation, 
that the possible world w1 embraces a provision of variant ‘nearby’ conditional 
composition, which means that it obeys a fundamental set of physical laws that 
prevail within our world w0.74 Wilson, however, shifts our attention towards 
appropriate modeling, once again: for instance, if we are planning to erect a 
building that we do not want to collapse, we will attend our architectural 
reasonings and model our proposed edifice along a molecular physics basis, 
favoring the collections of descriptive parameters and computational policies that 
 
73 Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol II, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2003, 355. This inflationist position allows constructions that descent 
into infinitesimal oblivion. 
74 David Lewis, Counterfactuals, New York, Wiley-Blackwell, 2001. Such patterns as Lewis’ demonstrate 
uncritical faith in coarse structural distinctions; Theory T thinking as such was canonically formulated by 
the logical empiricists of the 1950s. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 620 
 
best insure against injurious collapse. In doing so, we seek established constraints 
in the realm of macroscopic facthood without worrying needlessly about lower-
scale complications. Such traits are generally abstract in their conceptual 
contours and, therefore, we have to specify these specialized collections of 
localized possibilities within search spaces, thus insulating counterfactuals. 
Therefore, “[w]ell-selected and localized possibility spaces commonly serve the 
important purpose of insulating macroscopic descriptive claims about substantive 
reliance upon the complexities of microscopic fact” (290). 
How, then, do we contend with the fact that the central utilities of ‘possibility 
spaces’ are anchored by the means in which they allow us to evade reliance upon 
lower-scale details? By co-opting Lagrangian methods, we can: i) eschew 
speculative assumptions regarding unnecessary constructional details, and ii) 
direct our reasonings to “important energetic traits hidden within a target system 
through the guidance of carefully assembled search spaces” (291). Rather than 
law-based speculation, by relying upon empirical experimentation we can, 
therein, derive counterfactual data. In doing so, we bar ourselves from the kinds 
of ‘free enlargement’ in Kripke and Soames. Rather, we follow the late 
Wittgenstein in agreeing that the presumption of off-handed appeals to absolutist 
possibly merits critical scrutiny. 
In order to further illuminate Wittgenstein’s thought we ought to concern 
ourselves with those “local packets of guiding ‘possibilities’ that appear peculiar 
in their contours”, such that these counterfactual claims “ask what happens under 
strange antecedent circumstances or possibilities that can’t be sensibly enlarged 
into a science fiction story of any kind, no matter how otherworldly” (293).75 
Rather than a priori possibility, drawing upon such counterfactuals shines a light 
on the data registration requirements of specific inferential engineering.  
As in the processes of optical design arrangement when creating an algorithm 
with which to design the basin of a Peaucellier mechanism, occasioning for 
motion conversion, finding the orientation of any optimal arrangement lies in 
 
75 Notably, Quentin Meillassoux terms frames such counterfactuals under the domain space of “extro-
science fiction”, wherein a target system does not follow from modified possible worlds that still rest upon 
the “reliable physics” of w0. See: Science Fiction and Extro-Science Fiction, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 2015. 
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restricting our attention to the possibilities of representation. Searching for an 
optimal sizing vis-à-vis proper setting for physical modeling(s), we select a space 
of restricted possibilities that are pertinent to locating the proper solution to a 
particularized problem. By drawing on a ‘guiding norm’ through refinement 
processes (e.g., a sequence of refinement processes that reduces the measured 
error on an output curve-to-straight-line motion), we can examine the movement 
related to “such-and-such possibilities of movement in a machine” without 
reducing it to “the ideally rigid machine that can only move in such-and-such 
way.”76 This does not mean drawing solely on the physical conditions for moving 
but play, as in the “play between socket and pin, the pin not fitting too tight in 
the socket […] The possibility of a movement is, rather, supposed to be like a 
shadow of the movement itself,” by which we do not mean “some picture of the 
movement”, but, instead, veer towards optimality such that we designate “the 
possibility [of this movement]” as “the possibility of just this movement.”77 
In Tractatus, Wittgenstein links hypothetical capacities with an a priori 
understanding of all the variations in absolute possibility that a given term will 
accept. The early Wittgenstein, as demonstrated by this stage of his thought, 
believed that unfettered knowledge of possible variation constitutes an essential 
aspect of the ‘local grammar’ of a term whereby this ‘grammar’ can be enacted 
but not coherently hermeneutically unraveled by being ‘spoken of ’. Wittgenstein 
later abandoned such absolutist conceptions of possible variation, although he 
retained the notion of a ‘logical grammar’ when considering the applications of 
specialized acquisition vis-à-vis the ‘firm control’ of a localized possibility space. 
As it concerns our pragmatic position, this means that the utilities of a specific 
specialized spare are linked to the empirical and algorithmic opportunities patterned 
from reasoning. There is no “a priori expectation that the distinct possibility 
spaces we frame within different applicational circumstances will fit together 
nicely at all, let alone cohere into grand possible worlds of a Kripke-like strip” 
(300). Rather, we can expect incongruent conceptions of possibility when 
switching our focus from the affordances of a localized design patch’s optimal 
design.  
 
76 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §194. 
77 Ibid., emphasis added. 
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What does Wittgenstein mean by ‘logical grammar’? As his thought 
progresses, Wittgenstein notes that “the movement of the machine-as-symbol is 
predetermined in a different sense from that in which the movement of any actual 
machine is predetermined.”78 Logical grammar can be explicated in terms of 
‘spaces of possibility’ associated with usage, but now such spaces of variation do 
not arise from a priori attachment to absolutist possible worlds, but practical 
advantages pertinent to human proceedings. This is a ‘connection in grammar’ 
because it is not causal or experiential but, “stricter and harder, so rigid even, 
that the one thing somehow already is the other, is always a connection of 
grammar”.79 Our intuitive connections (of ‘machine essence’) fade when we 
discover alternative pathways of machine improvement over time; localized 
control remains critically determinant of cognizing over shorter periods of time. 
Despite this it is not entirely incompatible with inferentialism, Wittgenstein’s 
‘logical grammar’ (a remainder from his Tractatus) is closer to the revisable a priori 
than those narrower task-focused concerns we share with Wilson. 
Instead, let us co-opt Lagrange’s virtual work methods, which execute a task 
similar to the employment of homogenization techniques when computationally 
mixing data obtained from different choices of scale-size. With Lagrange, we 
direct these methods towards data amalgamation, but in a “somewhat simpler 
setting where search within a restricted space of tweaked possibilities effectively 
blends data types that otherwise do not fit together well […] we begin within 
configuration spaces allied to the mobility spaces [already] canvassed but in 
which we introduce applied forces able to push the parts of a system around” 
(302). In doing so, rather than abiding by Wittgenstein’s notion of an intuited 
‘logical grammar’, we create a combination that exacts a deeper symbiosis 
between a specialized space of counterfactual claims and practical utilities that 
they underwrite. Higher-scale knowledge that is registered here is contracted via 
constraints, or geometric restrictions placed on the possible mobility of the 
variegated elements/parts of any target system. The virtual work measures of 
Lagrangian technique manipulate counterfactual possibilities—while keeping 
our time interval Δt small enough to reiterate this marching method computation 
 
78 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §193-194. 
79 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford: Blackwell’s, 1964, §128. 
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over and over, plotting evolving behavior over long spans of time—that guide us 
to the characteristic we seek to focus upon, supplying us with norm-guided 
searches that measure how far a given approximation departs from target 
behavior until we reach certitude stability standards. Such manipulations 
compute virtual work value by considering and modifying various possibility 
counterfactuals via effective functional compromises, exploiting reliable 
manipulation data gleaned from an experiment. These virtual possibilities 
determinately resist those ready enlargements into richer possible worlds as 
discussed earlier. Rather than appearing as redactions from a wider collection of  a priori 
possibility, the origins of  virtual work’s categories are directly related to modeling utilities.  
Thus, virtual work illustrate the investigative recommendations that the later 
Wittgenstein recommends. Where, in the Tractatus, he maintained the possibility 
of an absolutist universe of logical possibility “from which any localized specimen 
has been plucked, and further claimed that we aren’t ready to employ language 
at all until a complete mastery of this grand space of permissible variation has 
been acquired,” the later Wittgenstein commits to non-degenerate possibilities as 
being directly produced via utility; thus, principles such as ‘virtual’ reflect 
“strategic contours” and “look peculiar only as they are encountered within a vast 
ocean of amalgamated possibilities fed by many inlet streams” (311). As Lagrange’s 
method demonstrates, we assign truth-values to otherwise peculiar ‘virtual work’ 
counterfactual conditionals by way of the exploitation of higher-scale constraints. 
Contra bottom-up endeavors, exploiting localized possibility founded upon 
upper-scale knowledge of material behavior, we can identify important physical 
structure, such as available work potential. Thus, we co-opt Wittgenstein’s notion 
of long-term mutability regarding those epistemic “river-beds of thought” which 
“may shift”80 according to alternate strategic methodologies and technological 
salience. This warns us against conceit in any historically restricted intellect, 
which is always relative to a computational compass. The standard ‘possible 
world’ analyses of modal logic have, indeed, assisted our unraveling common 
patterns of linguistic behavior with respect to how we communicate necessity and 
possibility. But this also means that such talk has latched onto usage and training 
 
80 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1969, §96-97. 
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(i.e., the ‘early a priori’). Just as “computer scientists take their algorithms for trial 
runs over a representative sample of well-understood situations to see if any 
unanticipated glitches threaten their proposed reasoning procedures” (313), we 
similarly utilize inferential rules for structuring reasoning and, using these 
reasoning rules, cultivate counter-factual spaces as corrective checks for such 
deductive procedures. Despite our inferential repertory undergoes referential 
refocuses, a “strong psychology of classificatory confidence accompanies these 
adaptive extensions, in the sense that we are predisposed to assume that we 
already possess a suitable label for everything we encounter, no matter how 
unfamiliar” (314)—for instance, we confidently label a spindly blot ‘spider-like’.  
Despite vocabularies such as ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ should be generic in 
their contours, as when we first learn the term ‘force’ in a loosely focused manner, 
the chief grammatical structure of our language shapes how such early a priori 
reasoning co-opts inferential patterns that reflect grammatical distinction. 
Specifically, if reasoning capacities include the ‘searching through’ of relevant 
spaces for salient possibility, then this should mean that we integrate basic 
grammatical reasoning “in roughly the syntax-linked-to-possible-world-
semantics-pattern” (315). However, the computational demands of manipulating 
syntax when dealing with the external natural world often run against the current 
of such originalist expectations, with our early a priori presumptions altered and 
overwritten (as in Neurath’s boat). Wilson provides a prudent example: 
 “we swiftly acquire an early understanding of the word ‘rainbow’ by assimilating 
its usage to the geometrical reasoning patterns we associate with words like ‘arch’. 
But these inferential expectations must be corrected by the time a speaker becomes 
an adult, for the underlying physical phenomena demand a different set of 
reasoning policies [….] Making these corrective adjustments [….] we need to 
suppress the many ersatz possibilities that loom large [….]” (315).81  
That is, we require a linguistic vehicle for weaning from ‘rainbow possibilities’ 
concerning textual images (those storybook rainbows) and moving towards 
rainbows based in meteorology and optics. Tools of linguistic management 
provide the verbal instruments through which we can reach towards ‘real 
possibility’, redirecting patterns of usage as circumstances require. Via the 
 
81 Wilson, Wandering Significance, pp. 22-24. 
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bottleneck of such corrective agencies, our conceptions of ‘what is possible’ thus 
enlarge and contract over time. However, these have not just been latent within 
our linguistic skills since their inception—in fact, this is precisely the conceptual 
misconception that bolsters Wittgenstein’s static view of classificatory semantics 
and applicational development in Tractatus. Despite we rarely notice these 
inferential retoolings, for they seem to be camouflaged within our general 
manner of conceptualizing the world in scenario-centered terms, truth-values of 
a restricted class of counterfactual possibility are exploited in a manner similar to 
Lagrange’s, stemming from direct induction upon manipulative experimentation. 
The essential utility to Lagrangian modeling methods is that they exploit our 
upper-scale knowledge of media (e.g., rigid wires and beads, prompting effective 
‘physics avoidance’ techniques). Such exploits permit us to facilitate ‘cut offs’ in 
regards to modelling complex (interior) processes that arise inside media (e.g., the 
waves arising inside a wire as they are buffeted by scuttling beads). To claim that 
truth-values of such counterfactuals are necessarily dependent upon the laws that 
they are designed to circumvent, grounding them in laws as analytic 
metaphysicians often do, overshadows how reliability-enhancing utilities develop.  
The informational thesis of language poses that the truth-conditions of 
descriptive sentences ultimately reflect the manner in which they segregate 
absolutist possibilities into two groups: 1) the world they accept; 2) the worlds they 
reflect. Accordingly, we anticipate that underlying semantics for counterfactual 
claims are anchored in allied discriminations amongst possible worlds. If this is 
true, “any English-speaker competent in counterfactual constructions must 
recognize how informational basis operates” (316). However, as the examination 
of Lagrangian technique suggests, we can readily invert this notion of truth-
conditioning and informational dependency. The information that we exploit 
within any technique is contingent upon macroscopic experiment rather than 
sub-atomic ‘carryings-on’, with corresponding truth-values running in parallel. 
Thus, if we characterize wires and rods as ‘rigid’, we apply applicational standards 
along the appropriate macroscopic scales of length and time. If we shift attention 
to other characteristic scales, we may describe such similar physical 
circumstances in alternative ways. Contextually based evaluations as such 
illuminate linguistic efficiencies—thus, the ‘truth conditions’ of virtual work 
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conditionals must be regarded as informationally rooted within the means 
through which we decide upon truth (i.e., direct inductions from experiment that 
are consequently corrected for virtual work effects). If, as in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, we hinge informational content upon mental abilities, we limit how 
epistemological dependences develop, segregating the ‘absolute a priori’ into 
these aforementioned two groups of possibility.82  
§VIII, "SEMANTIC MIMICRY"  
Let us now concentrate upon the supportive rationalities and problems of 
describing continuous material in a coherent manner, wherein the ‘function 
spaces’ or ‘possibility spaces’ previously describes are sewn into a cooperative 
logic that reinforces strategic functionalities that provide us with localized 
utilities. In the history of science, we see how methodological reappraisals appear 
where simple inferential transition from sentence A to sentence B turn upon a 
hidden machinery. Such are the circumstances of semantic mimicry, “situations 
where a language’s employers fancy that sentences A and B signify physical 
underpinnings of a certain type, when the real-world support of their modeling 
successes lies elsewhere” (327). Thus, surface syntactic resemblances can be 
deceiving, and it is by culling extension elements that we can improve our 
inferential-derivational landscape, in the same manner that adding complex 
points towards infinity to the regular Euclidean plane produces improved 
deductive efficiency. 
The treatment of physical modelling that is suppressed under the shadow of 
celestial mechanics floods back into the stage with finite dimensions, boundary 
and interfacial conditions, constraints, Fourier decompositions, and so on. Such 
a treatment requires a shift towards partial differential equations (PDEs) and 
away from evolutionary ODE-driven evolutionary processes. Theory T thinking 
 
82 We ought to admit that Wittgenstein’s notion of “hardened propositions” in On Certainty suggest that his 
conception of logical grammar may indeed be more akin to the notion of a revisable a priori as conceived 
of by Hans Reichenbach and, in a different form, Michael Friedman in their discussion on linguistic 
determination qua “space-time metric[s]” and their employment, rather than those narrower task-focused 
concerns Wilson is concerned with. See: Hans Reichenbach, The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965. Michael Friedman, Dynamics of Reason, Paolo Alto, Center for 
the Study of Language and Information, 2001. 
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has recast the reasoning patterns pertinent to an ODE equational basis into the 
format of elementary logic, accomplishing such trickery by converting the 
“smoothly flowing stages of an ODE-driven evolutionary process into long chains 
of modus ponens instantiations based upon alleged ‘general laws’ such as ‘[a]t all 
time t, if conditions A hold at t, then condition B will hold at time t + Δt’” (340-
341). Replacements of this stripe present an inferential advance within 
mathematical physics that are supplied by rules of elementary logic, rather than 
the skills involved in seeking out helpful inferential adjuncts, as in Green’s functions. 
Given an elastic material, we may observe that circular membrane—such as 
a banjo head—do not present us with corner singularities. However, we can not 
decompose or tesselate an arbitrary shape into circles without significant number 
of gaps. By creating such a decompositional passage, square, triangles, and other 
geometrical figures insinuate themselves into our mechanical prominence. 
Despite the impulse to dismiss such oddities as the result of ‘excessive idealization’, 
this is a haughty position, however, and, following Wilson, we will see how 
tessellation exacts descriptive demands, traversing between representational tools 
that mathematics makes available to us and the uncooperative natural facts 
behind such “mismatched representational” constraints and modeling 
parameters (336). 
Generally, we select boundary conditions appropriate to a problem 
depending upon the natural possibilities that are available. This is a kind of 
idealization with respect to underlying physics, of the same ilk as those 
approximations introduced with the representation of geometry, with loads and 
material behavior. Thus “when one thinks of permissible error in an approximate 
solution, it is understood to be relative to exact solutions of the governing 
equations that inherently contain various approximations.”83 We conceived of our 
original formation of how the interior of a membrane behaves and how its 
boundary region behaves as completely independent descriptive tasks—this is 
incorrect, however. Insofar as it applies to boundary membrane disturbance, the 
expressive analytic data that we obtain through algebraic information within 
Green’s function formula can be contrasted with the less informative numerical 
 
83 J. N. Reddy, Theory and Analysis of Elastic Plates, Boca Raton, CRC Press, 1999, p. 73. 
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data obtained from conventional computer simulation. Employing Green’s 
functional formula, and thus co-opting a functionalist and integrated perspective, 
our algebraic gα(x,y) expression “serves as a key out-of-territory way station along 
a very profitable inferential pathway” (331). In short, ‘out-of-territory’ reasoning, 
formerly regarded as ‘useful idealizations’, re-adjust the appraisal of descriptive 
practices and emerge as integral parts of a smoothly functioning portion of 
descriptive machinery.  
With Theory T diagnostic practices, we see the dilution of crucial differences 
concerning explanatory architecture. All explanatory differences are 
reformulated under the banner that ‘for all times t, if conditions A hold at t, then 
condition B will hold at time t + Δt’, which elides the unfolding dynamic processes 
qua evolutionary equations in equilibrium-based constrained state calculation(s). 
As Hadamard stressed, we can not comprehend the explanatory purposes of a set 
of differential equations without appreciating how, exactly, they fit together with 
their anointed side conditions (e.g., initial and boundary region values, interfacial 
jumps, and so on). To merely treat these considerations as undifferentiated 
auxiliary conditions, conflating physical descriptions with “initial conditions”, as 
Ernest Nagel does, prevents any hope of understanding how harmonization 
operates.84 
A related question concerns how do sentences that appear within our 
inferential practices encode pertinent information about the physical world? 
Those formulas that we have considered as merely ‘approximation statements’ 
encode central physical considerations—“[a] modern diagnosis holds that we 
mistakenly viewed the ‘semantical contents’ of the sentences appearing in our 
reasonings as individually interpreted claims, rather than as a collection of 
statements that must work together within a balanced descriptive network” (331).  
We must enlist descriptive harmony repairs between the mismatches that arise 
between applied mathematics and physical descriptions. According to engineers 
such as J. N. Reddy, when descriptive disharmonies and other such oddities arise 
within our descriptive policies, we ought to examine the mathematical 
 
84 Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), 32. Carl Hempel 
ascribes to as similar position with her treatment of “antecedent conditions” as does Karl Popper (with 
“Initial conditions) and Israel Scheffler (who employs all three phrases synonymously). 
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characteristics of all contributing parties, which includes our interior equation 
laws, for evidence of descriptive overstatement and approximations—“[t]he 
approximations are introduced through several sources, including representation 
of the geometry and boundary conditions, loads and material behavior.”85 Such 
suitable correctives involve the shuttling of informational content between former 
characterizations of ‘boundary’, ‘interior’, ‘interface’, and so on, such that their 
respective contents are adjusted until they reach descriptive accord. 
Mathematically, we can reach improved descriptive harmonies insofar as interior 
harmonies are concerned by examining “influence function.”86 
Cooperative symbiosis obtained between interior and boundary descriptions, 
where Green’s function Vα(x) acts as a natural inferential bridge, shows how 
semantic meanings are revised so as to remove inequities to provide harmonious 
cooperation. In pure mathematics, functions that are straightforwardly composed 
from elementary operations rarely capture targeted physical behaviors accurately 
over wide expanses of space and time. Thus, they “fall out of accurate correlation 
and must be correctively repaired” (346).  
In the 1890s, for instance, Hilbert provided us with a new means of resolving 
harmonization problems in disparate branches of mathematics (e.g., Riemann’s 
appeals to Dirichlet’s principle within complex function theory). Hilbert’s direct 
method within the calculus of variations was inspired by Richard Dedekind’s 
policies for filling in irrational ‘holes’ within the real number system through 
allied constructions. Under Hilbert’s method, we bestow energy norms that can 
be uniquely extended to a wider measure onto an enclosed, smooth and non-
optimal space, thus extending the non-optimal evaluative reach of descriptive 
labor onto a solution space α. By instrumentalizing such a space of approximate 
possibility, which is kept relatively small and appropriately focused, we ‘fill in’ 
topological surface holes via extension techniques within the space of functions. 
As such, we proffer possibilities such as when “two regions of surface contain the 
 
85 Reddy, Theory and Analysis of Elastic Plates, p. 73. 
86 Recall that, previously, we concerned ourselves with the problems of harmonizing square boundaries 
with uncooperative interior equations via Green’s functions of ‘boundary element’. In this new setting, we 
are concerned with “base characteristic manifold” shifts in regards to the static circumstances of, for 
example, “a stationary string loaded with weights [….] Here the pertinent interior formula is kd2y/dx2 = 
f(x), where f captures the local gravitational force density weighing the string down at position x” (343). 
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same strain energy content if they affect all measuring instruments in the same 
way, an assertion that we can apply to modeling gizmos like our sharp-cornered 
Green’s functions despite the fact that they lack the derivatives requires to possess 
a ‘strain energy’ in the old-fashioned, unenlightened manner” (350).87 
As the context of our virtual work considerations is concerned, by combining 
trial functions and their potential manipulations into a common space, we 
formulate a product of modeling functions that are unified along endpoint 
conditions. These conditions remain statically fixed and prompt a harmoniously 
enlarged setting, which produces new computational opportunities. We can 
search within a subspace along the Rayleigh-Ritz principle, locating an 
approximation substance along a sum of piecemeal linear (hat) functions (SFE 
broken line approximations). Additionally, we can restrict our inner product 
computations to our approximation subspace SFE along lowest energy demands 
within the specific SFE space employed. This “subdivision into simpler pieces” and 
 
87 Laurent Schwartz is perhaps the best example to consider such this semantic rebalancing. Consider, for 
instance, the following description: “Schwartz sets up a special space of test functions D’ comprised of 
completely smooth functions θ that he will employ to smear out Vα(x) enough that the mollified results will 
possess regular calculus derivatives. He does this because he wants to view our target function Vα(x) through 
the lens of how it appears to the measuring instruments modeled by the θ’s within D’. So he treats Vα(x), 
not as a regular function, but as a functional that acts on all of the test functions θ and produces a mesh of 
smooth curves that surrounds the two sides of the erstwhile function Vα(x) as closely as we might like. 
Intuitively, the ‘derivative’ that we would like our functionalized Vα(x) to possess should be the broken-line 
function ____----, indicating that Vα(x) possesses a constant negative slope up to the point α and a constant 
upward slope thereafter. How does Schwartz persuade the functionalized version of ____---- to serve as the 
first derivative of Vα(x)? Answer: by asking all of the regular calculus derivatives of the θ- smoothed 
companions of Vα(x) to surround the two pieces of ____---- in a similar mesh. If we repeat this demand a 
second time, we obtain a functional second Vα(x) that isn’t similar to a normal function at all, but rather 
represents a Dirac δ ‘function’ blip” (350-351). This re-orientation by way of privileging mollifiers is also 
highly related to Albert Lautman’s diagrammatic ‘phase space’ of rigorous structural appropriation, where 
energetic possibilities govern collective behavior, portending Deleuze’s fully immanent "virtual 
multiplicities”. As perhaps made most explicitly clear by Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis, the second 
synthesis, this ‘phase space’ invokes the possibilities of a system that cannot be reduced to its ‘vector field’. 
That is, these ‘virtual multiplicities’ are akin to concrete universals rather than the Aristotelian scenography 
of ‘essences’ (i.e., abstract archetypes). Thus, Deleuze writes that "[a]bstract machines do not exist only on 
the plane of consistency, upon which they develop diagrams; they are already present enveloped or 
"encasted" in the strata in general, or even erected on particular strata upon which they simultaneously 
organize a form of expression and a form of content.” See: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 165. 
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“the equations of equilibrium and compatibility between the pieces”88 means 
recasting our original physical problems into an enlarged and harmonized setting 
(355). Theory T thinking’s general approximation technique can lead to 
mistaking localized virtual work manipulation upon the region of a trial function 
with a direct interaction between neighboring plates, confusing manipulations 
with trial functions. 
Consider inspecting a small part of a three-dimensional piece of steel, where 
we find two unique kinds of force at work: i) ‘so-called body forces’ like 
gravitation, which act across distances to pull directly upon local points p within 
our steel, and ii) traction forces, which “push and pull on the smallish surfaces 
that surround p” (357). The traction forces sustain stress waves that ripple through 
our steel media object when we hit it with a hammer. A reconciliation problem 
arises, as these two varieties of force have both attached to geometrically 
incompatible regions—the ‘body forces’ to points and the ‘traction forces’ to 
surfaces; both types of force represent a density which requires a volume or surface 
integral to supply a finite force. Even if we examine so small a region of our steel 
media object, such that essentially only one body force acts inside it, we 
nonetheless have to confront the fact that its surrounding surface still carries an 
infinite bristle of traction vectors, which need to be processed in a way such that 
they can interact sensibly with the solitary body force at p. In order to do so, we 
need to invoke the notion of a ‘stress tensor’ located at p by fabricating a p-
centered force vector that interacts with body forces “after we slice through p 
with a selected plane” wherein “different slices produce different forces”, 
shrinking little volumes of our metal around these p points as in the shrinking-
processes pioneered by Cauchy in the 1820s (357-358). Consequently, we 
coordinate and reconcile body forces with tractions by focusing on the functional 
analysis recalibration of  the finite element, structuring these reconciliations qua central 
continuum mechanics structures obtained through a search within a subspace. 
Thus, “a linear triangular element becomes a pair of hinged rods; a quadratic 
element becomes a set of springs, and so forth” (359). 
 In short, despite the descriptive tools that seem to capture natural 
 
88 William Gilbert Strang and George J. Fix, An Analysis of the Finite Element Method, Wellesley, Wellesley-
Cambridge Press, 1973, p. 2. 
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circumstances aptly may not inferentially harmonize properly with those 
descriptions that seem appropriate to their target-media, there are mathematical 
means to enlarge conceptual constructions in set theory that, following Riemann, 
Dedekind, Schwartz, and Sobelev, we can occasion. This necessitates functional 
analysis, probing interfacial and intermedial queries concerning how should the 
information encoded within a linear differential operation be properly viewed? It 
is the infinitesimal element that prods our functional analysis’ adaptive 
developments and, in parallel, the adaptive developments of language. From 
algorithmic assistance supplied by seemingly ‘out-of-territory sentences’ which 
serve as a harbinger of unanticipated networks that implement novel forms of 
descriptive strategy to the inferential explanations that are registered contextually 
in the guise to tacit heuristic reliance, “sophisticated forms of informational 
content remain encoded exclusively within the manner in which the usage 
contextually unfolds and may not be available to immediate inspection in the 
guise of stand-alone declarative sentences” (361).  
 Wilson’s scientific realism is of a particularly contextual stripe, for here he 
is a rationalist who believes that our ongoing science of gradual accumulation 
bolsters a large and ever-increasing set of reliable ‘Truths’. Nonetheless, Wilson 
does not believe that the ‘truth-rules’ for these ‘Truths’ can be captured by the 
simple isomorphisms favored by ontic structural realists such as Steven French, 
James Ladyman, and Don Ross, who enlist a naturalized metaphysics. According 
to Wilson, ontic structural realism, as well as homologous positions such as John 
Worrall’s naturalized structural realism, “suffer from insufficiently flexible 
opinions with respect to the semantics of language” (361).89 This is, of course, to 
 
89 See: John Worrall, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds” in David Papineau, ed., The Philosophy 
of Science, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. James Ladyman and Don Ross, Every Thing Must Go, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. Steven French, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. Notably, one of the most direct analogs to Deleuze’s machine 
ontology is analytic philosophy is Ladyman and Ross' Ontic Structural Realism (OSR)—also known as 
information theoretic structural realism (ITSR)—whereby the understanding of being is conceived of as 
relational and without substance. As a philosophy of entanglement, OSR/ITSR rejects the idea that reality 
is ultimately composed of self-subsisting entities, individuals, or trans-temporal objects with intrinsic 
properties and “primitive thisness”, haecceity, etc. As Johanna Seibt notes, “[a]ccording to OSR the world 
has an objective modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on the 
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say nothing of his approach to mathematics where he is a would-be empiricist 
who would “rather not allow any portion of language to escape so flagrantly from 
the tribunal of experience” (363). For Wilson, the adequate responsibility of an 
exterior corrective is what prevents philosophy’s fall into apriorism.  
§IX, "A SECOND PILGRIM'S PROGRESS"  
Lastly, let us consider the critique of the sundry contemporary formulations of 
‘naturalism’ from the perspective of applied mathematics, particularly insofar as 
mistaken presumptions about the role that set theory plays within naturalism are 
concerned. For Wilson, philosophy of mathematics’ direction towards the 
imperatives of ‘naturalist philosophy’—as distinguished by texts such as Quine’s 
From a Logical Point of  View and Benacerraf and Putnam’s Philosophy of  
Mathematics90—has been unfortunate, to say the least. While Penelope Maddy 
attempts an admirable corrective,91 she seeks to detach her mathematical 
endeavors from concerns over linguistic reference. Wilson, on the other hand, 
views mathematics as playing a critical role in helping us understand how, exactly, 
subtle referential strategies operate. If we develop a conception of ‘naturalistic 
obligation’ that does not reflect the linguistic policies that take advantage of 
mathematical thought, then any such conception of ‘naturalism’ will be improper. 
What do we know about our computational position with nature? The answer 
relies upon scale and temporal dependency. The differing world(s)92 between 
organisms are determined by varied ranges of dominant objects and properties, 
“in the sense of representing the characteristic ways in which an organism attends 
to the ambient data available to it” (367). Wilson uses the example of a fly-catching 
frog, concocting its visual system to examine how a landscape is filtered away, in 
cone-like fashion, of topographical noise/irregularities. 
According to Descartes’ constriction problem, we do not possess sufficient 
 
intrinsic properties of a set of individuals.” See: “Quantum Mechanics” in Johanna Seibt et al., ed., Handbook 
of Mereology, Analytica, Philosophia, Munich 2017, p. 467. 
90 Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980. Hilary Putnam and 
Paul Benacerraf, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1984. According to Quine, mathematics serves science; Wilson rejects this claim. 
91 Penelope Maddy, Second Philosophy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
92 Knut Schmidt-Nielsen, Scaling: Why is Animal Size so Important?, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University 
Press, 1984, p. 9. 
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mathematical capacities for tracking the adjusted geometry of a continuous flow 
(e.g., water flowing through a pipe constriction). We ought not forget that this 
problem is also related to Descartes’ position that matter is, at its core, granular—
every component particle possesses a fixed size and shape at every moment. For 
Descartes, empty space could also never appear between such particles; they had 
to always be in contact. Thus, “at every particular instant every spatial array of 
fluid decomposes into a tight mosaic of contacting particles” (369). However, 
today we have to account for how a moving fluid passes into a narrowed portion 
of the pipe and the relevant rearrangements. For Descartes, mechanisms split 
integral particles into smaller pieces that are rejoined into different geometries 
later on. Nonetheless, consider the constriction process of fracture and fusing, 
which occurs instantaneously and leaves no vacuum gaps. Descartes claimed we 
are simply incapable of following “such an infinitary process through all of its 
component stages” and that “[w]e must bluntly acknowledge that natural 
processes frequently pass through stages of ‘indefiniteness’ that our finite minds 
cannot track with the limited reasoning tools available to us” (369).  
Descartes’ position is an early articulation of mathematical opportunism, wherein 
nature offers us restricted occasions wherein we can follow developing processes 
with reasoning tools available to us with mathematics. This need not proffer via 
anti-realist positions in respect to the external world—like Descartes, we can be 
robustly realist, while recognizing out limited capacities for tracking generic 
physical processes accurately over long spans of time by utilizing mathematical 
tools alone. This is precisely why Jacques Rohault, Descartes’ discipline, noted 
that “there are in nature things which are vastly more fine and subtle; we shall 
clearly see that what exceeds our imagination is not therefore 
impossible.”93Despite our inability to inferentially track intermediate stages that 
link incoming flow to outgoing flow across the tube, we can asymptotically match 
descriptive materials to capture the smooth flow, as in the Huygens-Wren 
treatment of billiard ball collision. 
Does not Descartes merely lack the differential equation tools to examine the 
flow of a fluid while it moves continuously through the narrowing opening 
 
93 Jacques Rohault, Rohault’s System of Natural Philosophy Vol 1, trans. Samuel Clarke, Farmington, Gale Ecco, 
1723, p. 37. 
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without forming vacuum-like gaps? This illuminates part of the answer, which 
concerns mathematical optimism, but does not deal with how the data 
concerning those events which unfold at the infinitesimal level can be converted 
back at the finite-size scale without appealing to numerical approximations. By 
drawing upon Euler’s rule reasoning and its coeval mildly transcendental realms, 
where differential equations posit unfamiliar curves without direct human 
experience, we can amend Descartes and offer how mathematical thought offers 
an “enlarged landscape in which the viability of a reasoning procedure of a 
computational stripe can be judiciously assessed” (375). 
If we re-express our governing equation in elliptic coordinates on a target 
system, a modification of Euler’s method to suit altered coordinates may supply 
reliable results at a much larger step size. Thus, we can improve our causal 
computation with strategies such as: i) taking a Cartesian coordinate computation 
and creating an elliptic coordinate system, as well as ii) examining perturbation 
computation (e.g., taking account of the side-to-side weaving perturbations in a 
sinusoidal flight path of a goose flying around its nest). Returning to the fly-
catching frog and how it is embedded within a structural landscape within which 
the frog identifies strategic visual opportunity, we can take heed of the insect’s 
curves around the frog. Modeling considerations here depend upon a particular 
scale length (between organism, geographical environment, and target system) 
which we can characterize as ‘dominant behavior’ terms relative to scale 
selection, wherein fine-grained interactions are less reliably controlled. As a 
mapping-to-cusp singularity of data registration, the frog’s fly-catching routine is 
mapped within a strategic environment qua adaptive behaviors: 
 “[i]f the insect victim’s reversing curves are very tight and their trajectories 
remain approximately coplanar at these reversing points, the escape paths can be 
nicely projected onto two-dimensional curves with cusp singularities” (379). 
Thus, we recast the problem of understanding adaptive behavior via the 
diagnosis of strategic environment in which these behaviors emerge by 
considering the relationship of profitable-strategy-to-opportunity as, essentially, a 
mathematical question. This does not mean, like Quine, that we posit 
mathematics as a projected science but, instead, side with Riemann, continually 
consulting general mathematical experience as a fount of useful strategic 
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borrowings and often unexpected ploys which stem from a unique structural 
domain, fine-tuning the descriptive holds of our descriptive encoding (e.g., “we 
first learn the advantages of factoring by working with prime numbers and later 
transfer these techniques, after suitable tinkering, to garbage can lids”; 383).  
 For Hilary Putnam and Richard Boyd, over time predicative expressions in 
science evolve to registering information concerning the world in simple 
predicate/natural kind pairings (e.g., “that ‘is 12° C’ will eventually link tightly to 
some property involving mean molecular kinetic energy”; 383).94 For Wilson, this 
is not the case and empirically false as there is no reason why linguistic 
improvements inevitably should follow in so simplistic a mode. Such a rigidified 
semantical position assigns standalone informational content(s) to individual 
sentences. This is problematic because of the operative terms necessary to fasten 
harmonious cooperation between the modeling ingredients (e.g., “interior 
equations versus the boundary conditions with which they must coordinate”; 
384). As Wilson notes, Putnam and Boyd would have more accurately noted that, 
as a science develops, its reasoning patterns and measurement techniques 
increasingly register correct information dealing with the physical world without 
making further simplistic presumptions concerning the means by which such 
information becomes encoded within linguistic practices.  
Contra those aforementioned would-be ‘naturalists’ cast under Quinean 
fantasies of ‘all-at-once’ Theory T postulation, Wilson prompts an ongoing 
process of semantic fine-tuning. Indeed, one of the primary reasons that we 
humans adapt more readily to varying circumstances compared to frogs is 
because we can “readily borrow and retune reasoning stratagems developed for 
task A to become novel routines for achieving task B, despite the fact that the 
relevant subject matters may scarcely resemble one another” (384). Such 
conceptual adaptations necessitate us to think in terms of applied mathematics, 
examining strategies in formal conditions and consistently engaging in semantic 
realignments as we enhance our referential grip to the world around us.  
How can we better develop the paradigm for understanding inferential 
strategies by mapping an original problem within a richer setting? One example 
 
94 Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 20. 
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is with the unraveling of series behavior, which Cauchy and his followers achieved 
by imbedding a real line upon the plane of complex numbers as, for instance, in 
reallocating a line upon an appropriate Riemann surface. Working through a 
probabilistic enclosure, where one seeks to find a required answer via an efficient 
set of refining questions (in which initial questions divide the available search 
space into spatial partitions of the same size), mathematicians say that such 
strategies operate through the contractive (or coercive) entrapment of the desired 
answer—“we progressively pose inquiries that ultimately squeeze in upon a ‘final 
point’” (390). The search-shortening capacities of probabilistic algorithms are 
composed of a cycling filter upon the enclosure.95 An example of this is with 
transferred mapping—for instance, considered in its own light, “the singular 
point at the center of the 2-D bow tie curve on the bottom plane […] exhibits 
puzzling behaviors with respect to its points of intersection with other geometrical 
figures, but the proper rules become immediately clear if we blow up the point 
into the setting of a 3-D curve” (392). This is precisely how 19th century Italian 
geometers untangled complex singularities. We can transcend ingrained 
limitations by mapping opaque circumstances into strategic settings, wherein we 
recognize tangent singularities, as in the example of an algebraic curve. That is, 
we recognize the tangent singularities of an algebraic curve more readily when 
 
95 Here we can create another bricolage between Wilson and Deleuze by focusing on the corrective answer 
via operative probabilistic strategies (Wilson) and relations being external to their terms (Deleuze). For 
Deleuze, a connection between two multiplicities immediately generates something that exceeds them. 
These syntheses neither concern perceptions of objects nor human experience. In the context of Deleuze’s 
machine ontology, to be what Deleuze calls a “Body without Organs,” a “Figure,” or a “problem” means 
to contextualize relations via neither a phenomenological nor an epistemological thesis. Syntheses are 
passive contemplations, pulling other (passive) entities into an (active) experience and, ontologically, all 
relations are thus expressed as a contraction. Therefore “every organism, in its receptive and perceptual 
elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations.” See: Gilles Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 73. For Deleuze, 
to be a multiplicity is to assemble other entities via contractions, proffering difference while also contracting 
each entity in turn (through repetition). As actuality transpires in the form of indirect contact (e.g., through 
sense or the event) and is relational, manifesting in the unity of machines, Deleuzean ‘difference’ is 
comprised of the virtual being fully absent from the actual—this is precisely how Deleuze theorizes of the 
radical distinction between ‘corporeal things’ and ‘incorporeal events’. This is related to how Wilson’s 
description of the contractive concerns itself with progressive questions asked gradually to squeeze an already 
narrowed search space into yet smaller components, creating a difference through (self-improving) 
repetition. 
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they are recast into a point-singularity setting, despite both forms of irregularity 
are entirely coequal, mathematically speaking.  
To comprehend the special functions that naturally arise from the equations 
of mathematical physics, their behaviors must be examined over a wider territory 
than the real line. This means recasting them via the complex plane, which is 
what led Cauchy to several of his breakthroughs in complex analysis when 
“investigating the convergence of series solutions to Kepler’s equation, which 
describe where a planet is in its orbit at any given time”.96 By mapping a function’s 
singularities upon the complex plane, we can understand the otherwise shrouded 
computational failures relevant to computing standard expansion techniques. 
Thus, such inferentially transferred setting considerations offer great value. While 
Descartes could only subscribe to a limited thesis concerning descriptive 
opportunism, today we know that we can accurately capture natural occurrences 
within mathematical thinking of a differential ilk. As the ‘mildly transcendental’ 
true solution is produced vis-à-vis contractive approximations, we can consider this 
logic beyond the limits of finite-step termination that can be concretely verified. 
For instance, consider an infinite number of improvements as required before 
Euler’s method approximations, which squeeze in on fixed-point targets and 
where set theoretic reasoning provides careful explication in order to find paths 
of resolution. Indeed, instead of providing ephemeral ontological reductions, “by 
replacing our intuitive pictures of curves and approximations by hard data on 
how coercive nets of real-valued n-tuples relate to one another through residual 
terms” we can utilize set theoretic thinking to achieve strategic ratification (398).  
Set theory’s extended hierarchies elaborate contractive processes and allied 
strategies, illuminating otherwise mystified modes of inferential technique by 
codifying mildly transcendental relationships between concrete calculation and 
target objects that have become obscured in the philosophical tradition (“due to 
Russel’s and Quine’s dubious methodological fables of Ockham’s razor parsimony 
and ontological reduction”; 398). However, as Dedekind’s work in set theory 
demonstrates—and as Sturm and Liouville’s work, which can be characterized 
as ‘ur-set theoretic’ illuminates, as it relies upon assumptions about contractive 
 
96 Tristan Needham, Visual Complex Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1887, p. 64. 
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‘fixed points’ that demand set theoretic tools for clarification—it is important for 
naturalists to recognize that set theory provides the natural vocabulary for 
articulating relations “that we lowly calculators bear to nature’s more abundant 
collection of processes” (398). 97 
In logic, we do not introduce new predicates, Px, through non-creative 
definition (viz., Px ≡…x… wherein P does not appear in the matrix) but via 
phraseology that contains definitive descriptions: (tx) (x is a Sturm-Liouville factor). 
Such introductions qualify as legitimate definitional extensions if  and only if the 
implied existence claim can be ratified beforehand. In the absence of a 
combinatorial operations based proof, set theoretic construction plays a critical 
role in amplifying concerns of ‘physical quantity’ to workable proportions 
concerning target systems. Rather than rigidified semantics, via Sturm and 
Liouville, we see how special traits can be located within a ‘mildly transcendental’ 
manner, “as the system invariants that, allow us, inter alia, to carry out a long 
series of shooting method computations that provide an increasingly accurate fix 
on the target system’s true behaviors”, factoring upon complex behaviors to 
enclose upon substantial traits (e.g., topology; 404). 
The classic remedy, the vector equation over a manifold, is an intuitive 
corrective, one where we periodically replace those charts of a descriptive 
problem—for instance, when we calculate a bird’s flight—with alternative maps 
centered upon new locales to modify apparent coordinate magnitudes by suitable 
 
97 Similarly, on the continental side, Alain Badiou appeals to set theory to constitute the register in which 
one thinks consistently of inconsistency, presenting the form of inconsistency that underlies all consistent 
presentation. Drawing the historical context for his dialectical alternative, in Being and Event, Badiou 
systematically develops a meta-ontological narrative that identifies ontology with the theory of inconsistent 
multiplicity, and the latter in turn with Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatized set theory. In relation to the 
ontological order of the pure multiple and the objective order of presentation, becoming or subjectivation 
emerges as unwarranted or “illegal” interruptions of the stability and stasis of the ontological order, implying 
a process which Badiou names an “event.” This initiates a creative process of construction, or “truth-
procedure.” These “truth-events” are manifested in ordinary situations (i.e., “worlds”) across four domains 
of thinking and practice, functioning as the “conditions” which philosophy aims to think together, relative 
to its historical moment: science, art, politics, and love. Within these domains, “truth-functions” form as an 
exception to knowledge or representation, in the sense of disrupting the objective distribution of “bodies 
and languages” through which one discerns coherent parts within a situation or “world”. For Badiou, the 
“truth-event” signals the emergence of a “strong singularity,” making the “inexistent” of a world appear 
with maximal intensity. See: Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham, New York, Continuum, 
2006. 
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adjustment factors. Insofar as we consider a bird flying across the globe, with its 
dominion of low numerical calculators, we can supplement the manifold, itself, 
with set-theoretic constructions based on computational opportunities (i.e., 
Euler’s rule calculations that can parallel the bird’s flight to a reasonable degree 
of accuracy, which we will improve). Thus, we ascertain correctible relationships 
between a target reality and concrete computational capacity. This remedy, 
pioneered by Dedekind, Weyl, and company, utilizes equivalence class 
techniques, abstracting an invariant target from more concrete appearances and 
using set theoretic techniques of framing to make more precise repairs, invoking 
transcendental departures from raw computational capacity.  
Unlike Leibniz, Euler accepted the ‘mildly transcendental’ nature of the 
differential equation, itself, as an adequate mathematical description. We follow 
transcendental consideration when considering how the word ‘manifold’ has, 
throughout this progression, co-opted a rich descriptive model for understanding 
a physical target, codifying the inferential procedures that follow in its reasoning. 
Rather than merely reducing set theory’s key objectives as ‘reductive’, (i.e., 
reducing ontological commitments) or ‘mereological’ (i.e., capturing a notion of 
‘part’ and ‘whole’), we can use it to articulate an enlarged portrait of our 
conceptual abilities. 
Can applied mathematics resolve Descartes’ concerns? We have considered 
his remarks regarding applied mathematics’ contention with indefinite behaviors 
in constricting pipe vis-à-vis “patched-together” asymptotics. So, we can alleviate 
Descartes’ pipe-constriction problem by employing differential equations.98 
Nonetheless, Descartes also articulated a second set of inadequacies regarding 
those curved paths that readily appear in nature, which are beyond the reach of 
geometrical description. Such curves can not be described as mechanical or 
imaginary “on the grounds that their contours can only be represented as images 
within the faculty of the imagination and not through rules cognizable by our 
 
98 In addition, actual circumstances also necessitate that we contend with “counterflows” that involve sheets 
of fluid sliding past one another in Helmholtz’s fashion, forcing mathematicians to address non-trivial 
questions of jump conditions. See: Anatoly I. Ruban and Jitesh S. B. Gajjar, Fluid Dynamics: Part I: Classical 
Fluid Dynamics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p, 204. Vladimir Shtern, Counterflows: Paradoxical Fluid 
Mechanics Phenomena, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
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purely intellectual powers” (409). Accordingly: 
 “[g]eometry should not include lines that are like strings, in that they are 
sometimes straight and sometimes curved, since the rations between straight and 
curved lines are not known, and I believe cannot be discovered by human minds, 
and therefore no conclusion based upon such ratios can be accepted as rigorous 
and exact.”99  
For instance, take the random configuration that a string assumes when 
casually placed upon a table. While the ancient Greek geometers accepted these 
curves as merely geometrical, according to Descartes, all points in such curves 
which we may call ‘geometric’ necessarily “bear a definite relation to all points 
of a straight line and this relation must be expressed by means of a single 
equation.”100 Descartes’ concern is with the methodological possibility of 
mathematics in grouping those successive states of curve-behavior together 
through inherently mathematical relationships uniquely distinct form the 
processes nature, itself, employs. According to mathematics’ strong rules of 
analytic continuation, pieces are bound together in a single-generated function 
untrue to nature’s fluid particles. One basic computational solution seems to 
construct partial solutions by extracting proposals from a modeling equation and 
matching them with an interior, introducing a replacement rule and a connection 
formula. This also introduces non-trivial questions of data harmonization (i.e., 
the problem of connecting data across a tear). This involves matching conditions 
across an interface where, to work with standard differential equation models 
successfully, we seek suitable descriptive locales where we can opportunistically 
position the interfaces, tears, boundary conditions, and so forth in order to patch 
them together through interior modelings in cooperative harmony. Thus, we 
forge an entanglement “with side condition requirements that encode other forms 
of physical process in a more compressed manner” (413; emphasis added).  
There is, indeed, great benefit to modeling media with such alien ingredients, 
using crude repairs to profitably redirect our inferential forays. This shows a 
reason to resist the static conception of mathematics’ obligations within science 
 
99 René Descartes, The Geometry of René Descartes, trans. D. E. Smith and M. L. Latham, New York, Dover, 
1954, p. 91 
100 Ibid., p. 48. 
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that is promoted by Quine. According to Quine’s presumption, it is profitable to 
conceive of science as operating via all-at-once postulation, where at any given 
moment we accept an all-embracing Theory T that supplies us with a fixed 
vocabulary that we employ when operating within T’s empirical ambit. 
According to Quine, as T’s empirical prowess turns towards a different direction, 
we can seek a replacement T’ and proceed as before, weaving together a 
patchwork via necessities of strategic adaptation, innovation, and inferential 
monitoring. Thus Quine’s aperçu, that “the only mathematics that physics requires 
for its own purposes is whatever expressive tools are required to convey its 
fundamental postulates”, reducing physics’ needs to a low level with in set theory’s 
analytic hierarchy (416). Epistemologically, however, with the Quinean Neurath’s 
boat we are confronted with a moment in natural history where we face great 
conceptual difficulty in contending with syntactic disharmony. We simply can not 
gauge the degree to which future developments in concept formation will allow 
us to improve our descriptive grip on nature in a manner that can completely 
transcend the necessities to move from one descriptive opportunity to another. 
One day, we may move past this patchwork of descriptive fabric, stitched together 
in accordance to dominant behavior. Perhaps the enlarged assistance of set 
theory’s conceptual tools will eventually allow for every process in nature to be 
fitted to an “appropriate set of *** without abrupt corrections,” with suitable side 
conditions adjoined, “where the *** capture some wider sense of mathematical 
process than our ‘differential equations’” (415). However, it is equally possible that 
we may have to eventually resign ourselves to a subdued descriptive opportunism, 
acknowledging that the successful application of mathematics to the world and, 
more specifically, to media, requires abrupt stitching on order to keep our 
reasoning running. Such strategic ‘avoidance(s)’ do not promote an anti-realistic 
philosophical doctrine; rather, they simply allow us to record the fact that certain 
forms of unfolding natural processes can not be adequately and perfectly tracked 
by effectively programmable numerical methods.  
This does not mean that we have to abandon Quine’s pragmatic empiricism 
with respect to linguistic meaning, however. Instead, it is the semantic rigidity of 
Putnam and Benacerraf that we oppose where, with respect of physical 
terminology (and not mathematics) we possess a firm and constant conception of 
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the referential facts that must obtain within the external world for the sentential 
applications of that vocabulary to qualify as truth or false (417). This thesis is 
stilted by the a priori confidence of Frege, where nature and algorithmic struggles 
neatly contend. According to Benacerraf, any “physical proposition p places 
restrictions on what the world can be like” and “our knowledge of the world, 
combined with our understanding of the restrictions placed by p, given by the 
[referential] truth-conditions of p,” tells us that a given individual can or can not 
“come into possession of evidence sufficient to come to know that p.”101 According 
to this position, a Tarskian theory of truth, we have a firm referential grip of 
truth-conditions and how they structurally relate to the inferential policies we 
apply to propositions: “logical relations are subject to uniform treatment: they are 
invariant with subject matter” and, “[i]ndeed, they help define the concept of 
‘subject matter’”, for the very “same rules of inference may be used and their use 
accounted for by the same theory which provides us with our ordinary account 
of inference.”102  
According to this doctrine, our physical claims experience no difficulties in 
aligning themselves with exterior truth-values despite mathematics cannot tie its 
own references causal bonds. That is, physical vocabulary earns its inferential 
and referential credence in a direct manner, an appeal to truth-conditionings that 
is entirely based on component-decompositional policies of reference-linkage. 
However, reality proves stochastic, where such Tarski-style soundness proofs of 
the external world—which support such a simple predicate-to-extension 
picture—collapse under scrutiny. Indeed, these inferential warrants are always 
provisional, “hostage to the consideration that they may rest upon a faulty picture 
of how physical information is actually encoded within a descriptive language” 
(419). Again, none of  this is to suggest that logic is empirical. Rather, those semantic 
pictures—i.e., theses about word/world relationships—that we rely upon when 
deciding if our vocabularies conform to familiar logical categories or not can, 
indeed, prove erroneous. So, the problem is not with logic, but with semantic 
diagnosis. While logic creates the inferential purview of a scientific discipline, its 
real-world application limits its correlational portraiture; no matter how clearly 
 
101 “Mathematical Truth” in Putnam and Benacerraf, Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 413. 
102 Ibid., p. 411. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 644 
 
laws codify scientific premises, real-world application produces isolated patches, 
or protectorates, that are held down solely through homogenization and other 
forms of counterfactual asymptotic stitching. The inferential imperatives of 
implementing a useful strategic opportunity outweigh the utilities of obeying 
logical rules. In turn, a true naturalist position accepts that any substantial 
mathematics is required to ascertain how we reason with respect to everyday 
physical vocabularies, rather than accepting the picture of word/world 
correlation. Our naturalism is adaptive, diversifying in response to shifting 
currents and scales, profiting from new data and settings, providing us with a 
continuous picture of mathematical thinking. Such a process of coeval logical and 
metaphysical explication thereby captures the ‘movement’ or necessary relations 
of material incompatibility (‘determinate negation’) and consequence 
(‘mediation’) that holds between concepts and states of affairs alike, which is 
always implicit in the way consciousness inferentially relays its object. 
 
 
